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MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT ARTICLE 3 OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: A
SUGGESTED METHODOLOGY AND
PROPOSED REVISIONS
LARY LAWRENCEt
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs the law of
commercialpaper. Courts have tried to apply Article 3 as f it were a
comprehensive code. Professor Lawrence asserts that the Negotiable
Instruments Law (N.L.), the statutory predecessor of Article 3, was
not a code because it was not a comprehensive and preemptive state-
ment of the law of negotiable instruments. Because Article 3, based on
the N.IL, is similarly not such a comprehensive and preemptive state-
ment, it is not a true code either. He identjffes threeproblems with ap-
plying a code methodology to Article 3: (1) Article 3 is filled with
inconsistent terminology; (2) Article 3 is explicitl intended to supple-
ment, rather than preempt, the common law; and (3) Article 3 was not
intended to cover situations not envisioned by its drafters. He maintains
that the provisions of Article 3 can only be interpreted properly by ex-
amining the N.IL provisions upon which they are based, and that Arti-
cle 3 should not be forced to cover situations to which it was never
meant to apply. Professor Lawrence concludes by suggesting how the
drafters of the New Payments Code can amendArticle 3 so that it may
be treated more appropriately as a code.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its promulgation, Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.),' which covers the law of commercial paper, has perplexed judges,
lawyers, scholars, and students alike. This confusion can be attributed to two
causes: (1) the failure of the drafters of Article 3 to provide comprehensive
rules that use consistent terminology understandable without reference to pre-
U.C.C. law, or to foresee potential problems that did not exist under the prior
Negotiable Instruments Law (N.I.L.); and (2) the failure of those now inter-
preting Article 3 to understand these shortcomings and to interpret Article 3 in
light of them.
Most judges, lawyers, and scholars have attempted to apply Article 3 as
though it were a comprehensive and integrated set of rules, or, in other words,
j Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. B.A. 1970, University of Cali-
fornia at Los Angeles; J.D. 1973, University of California at Berkeley School of Law. Coauthor,
HAWKLAND & LAWRENCE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES (ART. 3). This Article is funded
by a grant from the UNC Law Center.
I. All citations to the U.C.C are to the 1978 edition unless otherwise indicated; all citations
to the N.I.L. are to the 1934 edition.
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as a "code. ' 2 This Article demonstrates that Article 3 is not a code and exam-
ines the causes of the popular misconception that Article 3 is a code. It then
suggests a more suitable methodology for interpreting Article 3. Finally, since
the New Payments Code is now being drafted for the purpose of amending
Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C.,3 the Article suggests how Article 3 should be
revised so it may properly be treated as a code.
II. PURPOSES FOR DRAFTING THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
When the effort began to draft the Uniform Commercial Code, the vari-
ous state rules governing commercial transactions were often in conffict. 4 A
lawyer would have had to spend many hours of research to safely advise his
client about the legal consequences of conduct in another state. Because com-
mercial statutes generally were outdated and only sporadically contained the
applicable rules, a lawyer often would have to undertake substantial case re-
search before he safely could give such advice even within his own state.5 Due
to innumerable cases that frequently conflicted, even extensive research often
failed to yield a clear and certain answer.6
The drafters realized that in the field of commercial law there was a spe-
cial need for a "relatively compact, relatively accessible, relatively stable body
of law which will not cost a week's research for each ten-minute consulta-
tion.' 7 Thus, in undertaking to draft the U.C.C., the drafters had formulated
certain general goals: (1) to make the law uniform among the different states; 8
(2) to make the law more certain;9 (3) to correct undesirable decisions; 10 (4) to
2. A "code" can be described as a preemptive, systematic and comprehensive enactment of
a whole field of law. It is preemptive in that it displaces all law other than that which it excepts. It
is systematic in that all parts, arranged in orderly fashion with consistent terminology, form an
interlocking, integrated body, revealing its own plan and containing its own methodology. Fi-
nally, it is comprehensive.in that it is inclusive and independent so as to be administered in ac-
cordance with its own basic policies. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962
U. ILL. L.F. 291-92 (1962). The best examples of codes in this sense of the term are the German
and French Civil Codes. Patterson, The Cod#/cation o/Commercial Law in Light of Jurisprudence,
in I STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1955: STUDY OF
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 41, 67 (1955) [hereinafter cited as 1 STATE OF NEW YORK].
See generally Schlesinger, The Uniform Commercial Code in Light of Comparative Law, in 1
STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1955; STUDY OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 87-123 (1955); Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 330 (1951).
3. The Articles 3, 4 and 8 Committee of the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("Board") issued its Tentative Draft No. 3 of the New Payments Code in May,
1983. It is anticipated that the final draft will be presented to the Board's authorizing bodies, the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
in the summer of 1984.
4. Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1044 (1961); Rossman,
Unformity ofLaw: An Elusive Goal, 36 A.B.A. J. 175 (1950).
5. Gilmore, The Unform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364,
379 (1952); Llewellyn, Why We Need the Un/form Commercial Code, lOU. FLA. L. REV. 367, 371
(1957).
6. Gilmore, supra note 4, at 1041.
7. Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 373.
8. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c); Rossman, supra note 4.
9. Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 369, 370, 377.
10. Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 380.
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eliminate the need for extensive case law research;' (5) to make the law more
understandable; 12 and (6) to modernize the law to correspond to modem busi-
ness practices. 13
The drafters were familiar with the commercial codes of France and Ger-
many.' 4 They realized that to achieve their goals it was essential that the
U.C.C. be in the nature of a civil law code.' 5 A statute that laid down rules for
specific situations to be construed narrowly by the courts would not accom-
plish their goals. 16 A statute would become so encrusted with conflicting case
law that the problems that necessitated drafting the U.C.C. would haunt the
U.C.C. itself. The Reporter for Article 9, the late Professor Grant Gilmore,
explained the distinction between a "code" and a "statute" as follows:
A "statute," let us say, is a legislative enactment which goes as far as
it goes and no further: that is to say, when a case arises which is not
within the precise statutory language, which reveals a gap in the stat-
utory scheme or a situation not foreseen by the draftsmen (even
though the situation is within the general area covered by the stat-
ute), then the court should put the statute out of mind and reason its
way to decision according to the basic principles of the common law.
A "code," let us say, is a legislative enactment which entirely pre-
empts the field and which is assumed to carry within it the answers to
all possible questions: thus when a court comes to a gap or an un-
foreseen situation, its duty is to find, by extrapolation and analogy, a
solution consistent with the policy of the codifying law; the pre-Code
common law is no longer available as an authoritative source. We
may take another, subsidiary distinction between "statute" and
"code." When a "statute," having been in force for a time, has been
interpreted in a series of judicial opinions, those opinions themselves
become part of the statutory complex: the meaning of the statute
must now be sought not merely in the statutory text but in the statute
plus the cases that have been decided under it. A "code," on the
other hand, remains at all times its own best evidence of what it
means: cases decided under it may be interesting, persuasive, cogent,
but each new case must be referred for decision to the undefiled code
text.17
A true code, as Gilmore defined it, cannot be drafted.' 8 The infinite vari-
ety of commercial transactions and the innumerable potential problems aris-
ing from these transactions would require the drafting of an infinite number of
11. Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 373; Gilmore, supra note 5, at 379.
12. Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 369; Schnader, The New Commercial Code: Modernizing Our
Uniform CommercialActs, 36 A.B.A. J. 179 (1950).
13. Schnader, supra note 12 at 182; see also Leary, CommercialPaper: Article 11I, 16 ARK. L.
R~v. 33, 35 (1961).
14. See supra note 2.
15. See supra note 2.
16. Gilmore, supra note 4, at 1043.
17. Id.
18. 1 STATE OF NEw YORK, supra note 2, at 37 n.2 (1955); Patterson, supra note 2, at 67.
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rules.19 Even if a true code could be drafted, it is doubtful whether it ever
would be accepted in a country with a common-law tradition as strong as ours.
Our long tradition of leaving to the judiciary the task of alleviating the harsh-
ness of general rules and of molding those rules to accommodate changes in
business practices is too strong to give way to an inflexible set of totally pre-
emptive and comprehensive rules. Yet, a statutory scheme could be drafted
that possesses enough characteristics of a true code to be called a "code" 20 and
which would permit, in most instances, the use of a code methodology.21
To achieve the goals desired by the drafters, the U.C.C. must have certain
code characteristics. First, to reduce greatly the need for case law research, the
U.C.C. has to contain rules governing virtually all of the commonly arising
problems.22 Second, the scope of the rules has to be clear to both judges and
lawyers. 23 Each rule must make clear the extent to which non-U.C.C. law is
displaced by the rule and must be specific enough to enable a judge or lawyer
to know the cases in which the legislature has dictated the legal consequences
of particular conduct (as opposed to leaving the decision to the courts).24 Un-
less the scope of each rule is clear, courts will be required, on an ad hoc basis,
to interpret ambiguous rules and to determine which non-U.C.C. rules are still
in effect. With little guidance to the appropriate answers, different courts
could reach conflicting results. Certainty and uniformity would be lost.25
Third, the rule chosen has to be general enough to permit courts to shape
predictable answers to unforeseen questions.26 It has to be flexible enough
both to accommodate changes in business practices or relations27 and to en-
able a court, in an appropriate case, to grant relief when grave injustice would
otherwise result from application of the rule.28 This flexibility could be
achieved by incorporating an element of judicial discretion into the rule or by
making clear which type of transactions or business practices or relations the
rule was intended to govern. Without this flexibility a court would be en-
19. 1 STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 2, at 37 n.2; Patterson, Supra note 2, at 67.
20. See supra note 2 for a discussion of the term "code." "Code" has also been defined as
"an orderly and authoritative statement of the leading rules of law on a given subject." I STATE
OF NEw YORK, supra note 18, at 37, (quoting H. GOODRICH, Restatement and Codifcation in
FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS 241, 243 (1949)).
21. See supra text accompanying note 17. As long as a statutory system attempted to set forth
in an orderly manner virtually all of the leading rules composing a body of law, reasoning by
means of extrapolation and analogy from the rules stated would be the proper means of deciding
any issue within the scope of one of the stated rules. As long as the specific rules stated are
intended to displace all other rules related to the principle involved, a code methodology would be
appropriate. It is not essential that every potential type of problem in the specific subject matter
be covered by a rule. Excluded issues-as long as it is clear which issues are excluded--could be
treated as problems of common law without in any way negating the propriety of using the code
methodology when preemptive rules are provided.
22. 1 STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 2, at 37.
23. Llewellyn, upra note 5, at 375; Patterson, upra note 2, at 68.
24. Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 375; Patterson, supra note 2, at 68.
25. Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 369-70.
26. Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 368.
27. U.C.C. § 1-102 comment I; Mentschikoff, Highlights ofthe Unform Commercial Code, 27
MOD. L. REv. 167, 171 (1964).
28. Hawkland, supra note 2, at 304-09; Mentschikoff, supra note 27, at 171.
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couraged to stretch or misapply a rule either to accommodate unforeseen situ-
ations or to prevent injustice in a particular case,29 further reducing certainty
even in cases in which the rule clearly was intended to apply. When a court
stretches or misapplies a rule in one case, a lawyer cannot know whether the
court is adopting generally that interpretation of the rule or whether the inter-
pretation was intended to be limited to the specific facts of that case.
The drafters of the U.C.C. believed that they successfully had endowed
the U.C.C. with the characteristics of a code.30 Karl Llewellyn, Chief Re-
porter of the U.C.C., in praising the drafters' accomplishments, stated that
certainty had been increased by the adoption of the U.C.C. because one no
longer needed case law knowledge but could rely upon the text of the U.C.C.
and practice guides alone.31 The "General Provisions" contained in Article 1
further demonstrate this belief.32 For instance, Section 1-102(1) states: "This
Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying pur-
poses and policies." Section 1-102(2) stated these purposes and policies:
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through customs, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
Furthermore, the comments to section 1-104, in referring to the resistance of
sections of the U.C.C. to implied repeal, note that the U.C.C. is "carefully
integrated and intended as a uniform codification of permanent character cov-
ering an entire 'field' of law. . ....
Finally, section 1-103 provides that the rules contained in the U.C.C.
should be interpreted as preempting the common law whenever the two con-
ffict: "unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles
of law and equity. . . shall supplement its provisions."
III. THE DRAFTING OF ARTICLE 3
Since each article of the U.C.C. was drafted by a different set of draft-
ers, 33 it is not surprising that the eight substantive articles each exhibit the
characteristics of a code to very different degrees. Thus, although a code
methodology may be appropriate in dealing with one article it may not be
appropriate when another article is involved. A code methodology is not ap-
propriate in interpreting Article 3 because Article 3 probably exhibits fewer of
the characteristics of a code than any of the other articles. In order to formu-
late a more appropriate methodology for applying Article 3, it is essential to
understand the manner in which Article 3 was drafted.
Although the drafters of Article 3 may have intended to draft a code, they
29. Hawkland, supra note 2, at 304-05.
30. Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 377; Franklin, supra note 2.
31. Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 377.
32. Franklin, supra note 2.
33. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1, at 3 (2d ed. 1980).
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did not do so. Their failure can be attributed to an erroneous perception that
there was no need to redraft completely the then-present law of negotiable
instruments to achieve their goals.34 When the U.C.C. was being drafted, the
law of negotiable instruments had already been codified in the Uniform Nego-
tiable Instruments Law ("N.I.L."). The N.I.L. had been adopted by all forty-
eight states.35 Lawyers and bankers alike had felt that the N.I.L. generally
worked well. 3 6 It provided answers to many of the more frequently encoun-
tered questions,37 and provided some uniformity between the laws of the sev-
eral states. 38 While there were several statutory variations in the versions
adopted by the different states, the statutory language adopted was reasonably
uniform.3 9 Uniformity of the law was not fully achieved, though, because of
the roughly eighty judicial conflicts among the state courts interpretating the
N.I.L.40
Believing that the N.I.L. had worked reasonably well, the drafters appar-
ently did not question whether either its structure or its basic premises needed
substantial revision.41 They instead set out to accomplish four, more limited,
objectives. First, they needed to find a way to treat investment securities.
Since the N.I.L. covered all negotiable instruments, an instrument had to com-
ply with all the requirements of the N.I.L. in order to be negotiable.42 Thus,
in order for investment securities, like corporate bonds, to be negotiable, they
had to meet the same requirements for negotiability as did ordinary negotiable
instruments, such as personal promissory notes.43 But corporate bonds would
not be marketable if they did not contain certain provisions for the protection
of bondholders. 4 These provisions were inappropriate for ordinary promis-
sory notes.45 The N.I.L., having been drafted with ordinary promissory notes
in mind, prohibited many of these provisions.46 Yet corporate bonds also
needed to be negotiable to be marketable.47 Courts found themselves in a
dilemma. They either had to find that the inclusion of these provisions made
the bonds nonnegotiable, which would thereby destroy their marketability, or
34. Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 380; Leary, supra note 13, at 34-35.
35. The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was first adopted in 1897 by New York and by
1924 had been adopted by all forty-eight states. 2 STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW
REvIsioN COMMISSION FOR 1955: STUDY OF THlE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 775 (1955) [here-
inafter cited as 2 STATE OF NEw YORK].
36. Id. at 776; Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 368.
37. Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 368.
38. Id.
39. 2 STATE OF NEw YORK, supra note 35, at 775.
40. 2 STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 35, at 776; Schnader, supra note 12, at 181; Leary,
supra note 13, at 34-35.
41. Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 380; Leary, supra note 13, at 34-35.
42. Leary, Commercial Paper: Some Aspects ofArticle 3 of the Unform Commercial Code, 48
KY. LJ. 198, 203-04 (1960).
43. Id. at 204; Sherman & Feeny, An Examination ofthe Negotiability Concept of the Unformn
Commercial Code, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 297, 306-07.
44. See supra note 43.
45. See supra note 43.
46. See supra note 43.
47. See supra note 43.
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had to distort the requirements for negotiability under the N.I.L., thereby find-
ing the bonds to be negotiable.4 8 But adopting the latter approach would have
made it possible for promissory notes containing these same provisions, which
were clearly inappropriate for ordinary promissory notes, to be negotiable
also. To solve this problem, the drafters decided to provide separately for
investment securities by drafting Article 8. 49 Article 3 consequently was
drafted to cover only ordinary negotiable instruments. 50 The drafters' second
objective was to ensure uniformity among the various states.51 To accomplish
this objective, they attempted to provide a single uniform rule to eliminate the
conflicts of judicial construction that existed under the N.I.L. 52 Third, to a
very limited extent, they wanted to modernize some of the-more outdated rules
contained in the N.I.L.53 Finally, they wanted to reorganize and simplify
some of the N.I.L.'s more cumbersome provisions.54
The failure of the drafters to question the structure or premises underly-
ing the N.I.L. prevented them from making Article 3 a code. The N.I.L. was
not a code.55 Rather it was a set of specific statutes heavily supplemented by
case law.56 At a time when there was not a great proliferation of cases, a
statutory scheme supplemented by case law might, as did the N.I.L., work
reasonably well.57 But when the number of cases become great enough to
make legal research cumbersome, reliance upon too many rules of the com-
mon law undermines any attempt at codification. 58 By not questioning
whether the N.I.L. was drafted in the nature of a code, the drafters did not
realize that merely restating the rules already found in the N.I.L., together
with providing resolutions for conflicting judicial interpretations, would not
48. See supra note 43.
49. U.C.C. § 3-103(1).
50. Id.
51. Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 380; Schnader, supra note 12, at 180-82; Leary, supra note 13,
at 34-35.
52. 2 STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 35, at 776; Scbnader, supra note 12, at 181; Leary,
supra note 13, at 34-35.
53. Leary, supra note 13, at 35; Schnader, supra note 12, at 182.
54. Cosway, Negotiable Instruments in the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 Bus L. REv. 222, 224
(1954).
55. Hawkland, supra note 2, at 297. Professor Beutel believes that the N.I.L. was a code. He
contends that only because the courts interpreting the N.I.L. failed to treat it as a code did the law
become as unsettled as it ultimately did under the N.I.L. F. BEUTEL, BEUTEL'S BRANNAN NEGO-
TIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 80 (7th ed. 1948). Although it is possible that the N.I.L. was a code in
many respects, it did neglect to provide rules in many areas including, for instance, rules for
conversion and negligence. The extent of these omissions would appear to be sufficient to prevent
it from being a comprehensive code. As can be seen in the remainder of this article, correcting the
problems that arose under the N.I.L. was not enough to make Article 3 a Code. Chancellor
Hawkland contends in his article, supra note 2, that since negotiable instruments are not an entire
field of law, any statutory enactment would be only a fragmentary code and could never be com-
prehensive. Contrary to his contentions, it appears that a comprehensive set of rules which indi-
cates the specific areas in which the rules governing negotiable instruments are subject to rules of
law in other fields can be developed. Hawkland, supra note 2, at 310.
56. See supra note 55.
57. Gilmore, supra note 4, at 1041.
58. Id.
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make Article 3 a code.59 The task of making Article 3 a code may have been
possible without a whole reworking of the N.I.L. If the drafters had attempted
simply to incorporate into Article 3 all of the specific common-law rules they
had desired to retain and had indicated what areas they wanted to leave for
judicial discretion, the product may have been a code. But instead, probably
because of their own familiarity with the common-law principles that supple-
mented the N.I.L., they apparently assumed that all those using Article 3 like-
wise would be familiar with these principles. Very little thought was given to
whether the provisions of Article 3 could be understood without an under-
standing of the N.I.L. and its accompanying case law.
Since little thought was given to whether the basic premises underlying
the N.I.L. were still appropriate in 1950 or would remain appropriate in 1980
or 1990, it is not surprising that Article 3 was not equipped to handle changes
in commercial practices and relations. Furthermore, courts were given no di-
rection by the drafters about whether the rules of Article 3 should be applied
literally to problems unforeseen at the time of its drafting.
IV. ARTICLE 3 METHODOLOGY
Most courts, scholars, and lawyers, being unfamiliar with the manner in
which Article 3 was drafted, have employed a methodology in interpreting
Article 3 that would be appropriate only if it were a code. Article 3 has been
treated as though its rules contained an answer for virtually every commercial
paper question. Each rule has been interpreted broadly. Often, when no an-
swer has been readily apparent, any rule has been applied whose terms possi-
bly could be interpreted to cover the situation, even when it was fairly clear
that the situation did not fall within the intended coverage of the rule. 60 There
has been a consistent refusal to look to the common law in cases in which
Article 3 does not appear to be applicable. 61 Because Article 3 was not drafted
as a code, a code methodology cannot be employed. There are, in particular,
three serious deficiencies in the drafting of Article 3 that make the application
of a code methodology clearly inappropriate.
First, the terminology used in Article 3, even when specifically defined in
the U.C.C. itself, is not used in a consistent manner. Since many of the rules
found in Article 3 were drafted for the specific purpose of resolving a particu-
lar conflict that had existed under the N.I.L., the drafters' choice of terminol-
ogy was directed to resolving that conflict. 62 The choice of a specific term did
provide the intended answer to the question the drafters sought to resolve.
But, unfortunately, the drafters did not examine sufficiently whether the de-
sired results were achieved when the chosen term was applied literally to all
possible situations arising under the rule. As a result, applying a code method-
59. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform tf.] Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J.
334, 338 (1952).
60. See infra pt. V, C(1).
61. Id.
62. See Beutel, supra note 59, at 338.
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ology, which requires interpreting consistently all terminology used in the
same code, dictates questionable answers to many problems as well as answers
that clearly were not intended by the drafters. 63
Second, many sections of Article 3 do not state the general rules gov-
erning the subject matter intended to be covered by that section. 64 Instead,
these sections were drafted merely to provide rules when the case law under
the N.I.L. was in conflict.65 Thus, under these sections, answers to questions
other than those specifically covered cannot be deduced by a broad literal ap-
plication of the rules stated.66 As with the terminology of Article 3, attempting
to generalize from rules chosen to resolve very specific questions will not result
in reaching answers intended by the drafters.
Third, since the drafters simply accepted, with rare exception, the basic
premises of the N.I.L., Article 3 is drafted against a background of commercial
transactions and practices existing in 1895, the year the N.I.L. was drafted. 67
To the extent that these commercial transactions or practices have changed,
rules that were designed for them are being applied to new types of unantici-
pated transactions or practices. This results in applying value judgments made
about one situation to another situation about which no such value judgments
have yet been made.
The manner in which Article 3 was drafted necessitates use of a method-
ology substantially different than the one used in applying a code. One cannot
rely upon deducing answers to particular problems from the generally stated
rules.68 Although many problems may be answered by applying literally the
appropriate section of Article 3, many problems cannot be approached in this
manner. The only simple rule is that whenever common sense and a literal
reading of the section reach the same result, it is likely that the result reached
was the one intended by the drafters.
A more appropriate methodology69 for applying Article 3 is first to deter-
mine how the particular problem would be answered under the N.I.L. To
discover the result under the N.I.L., a judge or lawyer may consult numerous
legal treatises on the N.I.L.70 and the 1955 Report of the New York Law Revi-
sion Commission. The drafters intended to change very few of the rules con-
tained in the N.I.L. They were instead content, in general, to vary from the
N.I.L. only to the extent of choosing one of the conflicting judicial interpreta-
63. See infra pt. V, A. See generally, Patterson, supra note 2, at 64-65.
64. See infra pt. V, B.
65. See supra note 59.
66. See generally, Patterson, supra note 2, at 65-67.
67. F. BEUTEL, supra note 55, at 74.
68. See Hawkland, supra note 2, for a discussion of the application of the code methodology
to interpretation of the U.C.C.
69. Professor Beutel has suggested use of a similar methodology for interpretation of the
N.I.L. F. BEUTEL, supra note 55, at 93-101.
70. Some of the numerous treatises on the N.I.L. include W. BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES (2d ed. 1961); F. BEUTEL, supra note 55; J. OGDEN, THE LAW OF
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (5th ed. 1947). For a treatise on the law of negotiable instruments, see
J. DANIEL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (4th ed. 1891).
1983]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tions of ambiguous provisions of the N.I.L.7 t It is therefore usually safe to
assume that the drafters intended to adopt the same rule as that found under
the N.I.L. if they did not affirmatively indicate their intent to change the rule.
When a literal reading of Article 3 yields the same answer as that found under
the N.I.L., it is usually safe to assume that the drafters intended to retain the
N.I.L. rule. But when a section of Article 3 suggests a different answer, it is
necessary to determine whether a change in result was in fact intended. To
ascertain this, it is necessary to discover the precise problems intended to be
covered by the particular section by finding the corresponding section of the
N.I.L.7 2 and then to determine the precise scope and interpretation the courts
have given the section. As part of this inquiry it is necessary to focus on any
conflicting judicial interpretations of the section. Sometimes it will be clear by
looking at the text together with the comments whether the drafters generally
intended to change the N.I.L. rule or instead simply were providing a resolu-
tion for some unrelated conflict that existed under the N.I.L. When a reading
of the text and comments do not indicate the precise intent, reference to the
earlier drafts of Article 3,73 together with the comments to these drafts, often
will make the answer clear.7 4 In virtually every situation, this type of histori-
cal inquiry will disclose precisely why the drafters chose to express the rule in
the particular terms employed and whether change of the existing rule under
the N.I.L. was one of these reasons.
When the drafters intended to change the rule found under the N.I.L., the
question whether a court should honor this intention is simply the traditional
question about the degree to which a court should be bound by legislative
intent. Without very strong reasons to the contrary, the need for certainty in
commercial transactions dictates that a court should honor the legislative in-
tention. When it is discovered that the section, although seemingly applicable
to the situation, was originally intended to resolve some unrelated conflict, a
71. Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 380; Leary, supra note 13, at 34-35.
72. This task is made considerably easier since the "Official Comment" to each section of
Article 3 contains a reference to the corresponding sections of the N.I.L. in a section entitled
"Prior Uniform Statutory Provisions."
73. There are numerous prior drafts of Article 3. Most of these drafts and supplements to
drafts include notes and comments by the drafters. The following is a list of most of these prior
drafts and supplements: Tentative Draft No. 1 (1946); Tentative Draft No. 2 (1947); Tentative
Draft No. 3 (1947); Proposed Final Draft No. 1 (1948); Proposed Final Draft No. 2 (1948); May
1949 Draft; Spring 1950 Draft; Final Text Edition (November 1951); Official Draft (1952); Rec-
ommendations of The Editorial Board for Changes in the Text and Comments (April 30, 1953);
Supplement No. 1 to the 1952 Official Draft (January 1955); 1956 Recommendations of the Edito-
rial Board for the U.C.C.; 1957 Official Edition; 1958 Supplement to the 1957 Official Text (De-
cember 1958); 1958 Official Text; 1962 Official Text.
74. The notes and comments to the earlier drafts and the specific wording of the earlier drafts
are extremely helpful in attempting to discover the specific problems that the drafters were trying
to resolve in the section at issue. Determining what specific problem the drafters intended to solve
usually will explain why particular language was employed. By the same token, the omission of
any mention of a problem may at times indicate that the drafters did not have that problem in
mind when they chose to employ the particular terminology. The notes and comments to the
earlier drafts often contain insightful statements omitted from the Official Comment to the most
recent Official Text. It is usually fairly easy to determine whether the omission of the statement in
the Official Comment was because the drafters intended to reject the statement or for some unre-
lated reason.
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different approach must be adopted. Under these circumstances, a court
should determine whether the problem presented is similar enough to the
problems intended to be covered by the section to compel application of the
section by analogy. If not, then even though a literal application of the section
would seem to govern the problem, the section should be ignored and a court
should analyze the question as it would any common-law question. While a
court should not disregard the general policies of the U.C.C., it should not feel
bound by the general policies when a different result is dictated by the particu-
larities of the question. Similarly, when the types of transactions or practices
that the particular section was drafted to cover are substantially different from
those involved in the case at bar, a court should consider itself free to ignore
the section and approach the problem as a common law question.
Although application of this methodology defeats the purposes of the
drafters of the U.C.C. by requiring reference to both pre-U.C.C. law and non-
U.C.C. common law, such a reference is unavoidable since the rules were
drafted in light of the pre- and non-U.C.C. law. It is unfortunate that a lawyer
or judge cannot read Article 3 and thereby deduce the answer to most of his
questions. But since Article 3 was not intended to be interpreted in this man-
ner, the results reached by a code methodology are often not those intended by
the drafters. The suggested approach does ensure uniformity and certainty as
to all of those rules intended by the drafters to be included in Article 3. By not
misconstruing sections to cover situations not intended to be covered by the
section, courts are freed to fashion answers to unforeseen situations consistent
with the general policies of the U.C.C., but in light of new problems and
changing conditions. An analysis of problems generated by applying a code
methodology to specific questions arising under Article 3 discloses the need to
follow the suggested methodology. This analysis is undertaken in the next
section.
V. PROBLEMS WITH APPLYING A CODE METHODOLOGY
A. Inconsistent Terminology
One of the primary objectives of the drafters of the U.C.C. was to reduce
greatly the need for case law research by enabling a practitioner to rely upon a
literal interpretation of the U.C.C. 75 Another objective was to make the
proper interpretation of each section so clear that different judges could not
adopt conflicting interpretations.76 To accomplish these objectives, it was es-
sential that terms be used consistently throughout Article 3. 77 Otherwise,
courts would not know when they were supposed to interpret a term literally
and when a special definition of a term was intended. Different courts would
at times reach contrary conclusions. 78 Practitioners would thus need to re-
75. Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 373; Gilmore, supra note 5, at 379.
76. Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 369, 370, 377.
77. Patterson, supra note 2, at 64-65.
78. Id.
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search the case law to see how courts in the relevant jurisdiction were inter-
preting the term.
Article 3 gives the appearance of using consistent terminology when in
fact it fails to do so. Since the terminology is not used consistently, attempting
to apply the same definition each time a term is used results in undesirable and
unintended interpretations of many of the rules. Since Article 3 does not indi-
cate when the standard definition of a term is not intended, a judge or practi-
tioner cannot rely safely upon a literal reading of many of the rules. A judge
must therefore seriously contemplate the ramifications of adopting the stan-
dard definition of any term. A practitioner must research case law to deter-
mine how a court in his jurisdiction has chosen to interpret the relevant
section.
1. "Holder"
The term "holder" is one of the most important and basic terms in Article
3. "Holder" is defined in section 1-201(20) as "a person who is in possession
of. .. an instrument drawn, issued, or indorsed to him or his order or to
bearer or in blank." Unfortunately, this definition cannot be applied literally
to every use of this term in Article 3. The most notorious example of the
problems encountered in literally applying this definition of holder is its use in
section 3-406. Under section 3-406, "[amny person who by his negligence sub-
stantially contributes to a material alteration of the instrument or to the mak-
ing of an unauthorized signature is precluded from asserting the alteration or
lack of authority against a holder in due course or against a drawee or other
payor .... 
A purchaser must qualify as a holder in due course in order to assert the
preclusion of a negligent party.79 To be a holder in due course, the purchaser
first must qualify as a holder.80 If he traces his title through a forged or other-
wise unauthorized indorsement, however, he cannot be a holder.8' Thus, if
the definition of holder is applied literally, a purchaser of an instrument bear-
ing an unauthorized indorsement is not permitted to preclude the payee or
drawer from denying the unauthorized nature of the indorsement, even
79. As discussed in the text accompanying note 101 infra, some courts have held that a pur-
chaser of an instrument bearing a forged indorsement is an "other payor" and therefore can use
§ 3-406 to preclude the negligent party. Although "other payor" may have been intended to in-
clude any indorser who takes up the instrument, it certainly does not appear that it was intended
to include any purchaser. If it were intended to include any purchaser, the inclusion of holders in
due course within the class of persons protected under § 3-406 would be superfluous.
80. U.C.C. § 3-302(1).
81. Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 553 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1977); Sumiton Bank v. Funding
Sys. Leasing Corp., 512 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1975); Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank, 474 F.
Supp. 1225 (D.N.J. 1979); Tubin v. Rabin, 382 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Riggs Nat'l Bank v.
Security Bank, 10 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 460 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1972); Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v.
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass 1, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962); Foremost Ins. Co. v. First City
Savings and Loan Ass'n, 374 So. 2d 840 (Miss. 1979); Salsman v. National Community Bank, 102
N.J. Super. 482, 246 A.2d 162 (1968); Bank of the West v. Wes-Con Dev. Co., 15 Wash. App. 238,
548 P.2d 563 (1976); Atlas Bldg Supply Co., v. First Indep. Bank, 15 Wash. App. 367, 550 P.2d 26
(1976); Thieme v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 7 Wash. App. 845, 502 P.2d 1240 (1972).
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though their negligence substantially contributed to the making of the unau-
thorized indorsement. Therefore, if the term holder were given its literal defi-
nition in section 3-406, the resultant interpretation of section 3-406 would
manifest some very questionable policy decisions. For example, in a case in
which a drawer negligently mails a check to a wrong person, with the same
name as the payee, the depositary bank, which could not possibly discover the
error, would suffer the loss and not the negligent drawer. 82 Similarly, a payee
could recover for conversion from a purchaser of the instrument, including the
depositary bank, even though the payee negligently hired and failed to super-
vise a known forger who had previously, to the payee's knowledge, forged the
payee's indorsement on other checks.
Clearly, these results are unacceptable. There is no reason to deny the
purchasers of instruments bearing forged indorsements the benefits of section
3-406 while granting these same benefits to purchasers of altered instru-
ments.8 3 It does not appear that the drafters of Article 3 intended to interpret
"holder" literally in section 3-406. By adopting a literal interpretation of
"holder," a difference in the allocation of loss results from, for instance, the
negligent payee's choice to sue the payor bank rather than the collecting bank.
When the payee's negligence substantially contributes to the making of his
forged indorsement, he is precluded from asserting the forgery in his suit
against the payor bank for conversion. 84 But if he sues the collecting bank
instead he will not be precluded under a literal reading of "holder." Similarly,
assume that the negligent drawer, who mailed the check to the wrong person
with the same name as the payee, convinces the payor bank to ignore his negli-
gence and recredit his account. The payor bank can then recover from the
collecting bank for breach of their warranty of good title.85 Since section 4-
406(5) does not bar the payor bank from recovering from a collecting bank
when the payor bank fails to raise the negligence of its customer under section
3-406,86 the payor bank will recover from the collecting bank. The collecting
bank, not being a holder, cannot assert the negligence of the drawer under a
literal application of section 3-406 and therefore cannot recover on the instru-
ment from the drawer.8 7 Since they can not assert the drawer's negligence to
82. Even under the N.I.L., the drawer was precluded from asserting the unauthorized nature
of thepayec's signature in this situation. Citizens Union Nat'l Bank v. Terrell, 244 Ky. 16, 50
S.W.2d60 (1932); Slattery & Co. v. National City Bank, 114 Misc. 48, 186 N.Y.S. 679 (1920). But
see F. BEUTEL, supra note 55, at 465.
83. A purchaser of an altered instrument may be a holder in due course as long as he has
obtained all necessary indorsements and otherwise complied with the requirements of U.C.C. § 3-
302(1).
84. Cooper v. Union Bank, 9 Cal. 3d. 371, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973); U.C.C. § 3-
406.
85. U.C.C. § 4-207(1)(a); id § 3-417 comment 3.
86. Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.J. 1979); Mellon Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Merchants Bank, 15 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); U.C.C. § 4-
406(5); id. § 4-406 comment 7.
87. Although it can be argued that the bank can sue the drawer for common-law negligence,
permitting an action for negligence outside of § 3-406 could cause problems. Persons not intended
to be able to preclude the negligent party under § 3-406 might circumvent this prohibition by
suing on a theory of common-law negligence.
1983]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
establish the authenticity of the forged indorsement, they cannot become a
holder.88 The collecting bank therefore suffers the loss. But if the payor bank
decides to assert the drawer's negligence and refuses to recredit his account, as
they have the option to do under section 3-406,89 the drawer and not the col-
lecting bank will suffer the loss. The drafters could not have intended the
allocation of loss to depend upon these factors.
How does one then explain the use by the drafters of the term "holder in
due course?" Under the N.I.L., although there were not many cases on point,
a purchaser of an instrument bearing a forged indorsement usually could pre-
clude the negligent party from asserting the forgery.90 The controversial issue
under the N.I.L. did not involve forged indorsements but was whether a
drawer owed a duty of care to a holder in due course to prevent alterations.91
A majority of the courts held that he did not owe this duty.92 The drafters of
Article 3 disagreed with this position.93 To ensure that holders in due course
would be able to assert the drawer's negligence, holders in due course were
expressly mentioned as beneficiaries under section 3-406.94 Their inclusion in
section 3-406 was intended to extend the coverage of section 3-406 and not to
limit it.95 The comments to section 3-406 and the comments to earlier drafts
of the section fail to reveal that any thought was given to the allocation of the
loss resulting from forged indorsements.96 Had the drafters wanted to reject
the decisions under the N.I.L. that held that a purchaser of an instrument
bearing a forged indorsement could preclude the negligent party, they at least
would have mentioned it.
Virtually every court deciding this issue under Article 3 has permitted a
purchaser of an instrument bearing a forged indorsement to preclude the neg-
ligent party from asserting the forgery.9 7 Some courts98 have ignored section
88. See supra note 81.
89. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d
358 (1962); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Merchant's Bank & Trust Co., 28 U.C.C. REP.
SERv. 108 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979); U.C.C. § 3-406.
90. See supra note 82.
91. U.C.C. § 3-406 comment 2; U.C.C., Notes and Comments to Article III, at 15 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1948).
92. U.C.C., Notes and Comments to Article III, at 15 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1948).
93. Id.
94. See supra note 82.
95. See supra note 82.
96. See supra note 82.
97. Hermetic Refrigeration Co. v. Central Valley Nat'l Bank, Inc., 493 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.
1974); East Gadsden Bank v. First City Nat'l Bank, 281 So. 2d 431 (Ala. 1973); Trust Co. v. Port
Terminal & Warehousing Co., 153 Ga. App. 735, 266 S.E.2d 259 (1980); Insurance Co. v. Purdue
Nat'l Bank, 401 N.E.2d 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Koerner & Lambert v. Allstate Ins. Co., 374 So.
2d 179 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Mott Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 259 N.W.2d 667, 23
U.C.C. REP. SERV. 104 (N.D. 1977); Do All Dallas Co. v. Trinity Nat'l Bank, 498 S.W.2d 396(Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Swiss Baco Skyline Logging, Inc. v. Haliewicz, 18 Wash. App. 21, 567 P.2d
1141 (1977); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 98 Wis. 2d 474, 297 N.W. 2d 46 (1980);
Continental Bank v. Wa-Ho Truck Brokerage, 26 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 101 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979);
Empire Moving & Warehouse Corp. v. Hyde Park Bank & Trust Co., 20 U.C.C. RP. SERV. 480
(Ill. Ct. App. 1976). See also Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 148
Cal. Rptr. 329, 582 P.2d 920 (1978).
98. Cooper v. Union Bank, 9 Cal. 3d 371, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973).
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3-406 and have held that a party's negligence may preclude him under section
3-404, which contains no requirement that the purchaser be a holder in due
course.99 It is possible that the drafters did intend to provide protection for
purchasers of instruments bearing forged indorsements under section 3-404.
Indeed, some cases under the N.I.L. found that negligence was a ground for
preclusion. 1°° The problem with this interpretation is that it makes section 3-
406 completely superfluous as to unauthorized signatures. Since a person need
not be a holder in due course to invoke the protection of section 3-404, a pur-
chaser always would claim preclusion under section 3-404, rather than section
3-406, to avoid the requirement of proving "due course" status. This would
permit a transferee who either had notice of a claim or defense or had not even
taken for value to assert the preclusion of the negligent party. It is extremely
unlikely that the drafters intended these consequences. Other courts have held
that the purchaser is an "other payor" under section 3-406 and thus is entitled
to assert the preclusion of the negligent party. 10 1 Adopting this rationale
clearly distorts the meaning of "payor."'102 Less distortion is involved if it is
recognized that the drafters did not have this issue in mind when they drafted
section 3-406. Although they intended to limit protection to holders in due
course, when a forged indorsement is involved the determination of holder in
due course status should be made after the negligent party is precluded from
asserting the unauthorized nature of the signature. 10 3
A similar problem exists with adopting a literal definition of the term
"holder" in section 3-417(2). Under section 3-417(2) "[a]ny person who trans-
fers an instrument and receives consideration warrants to his transferee and if
the transfer is by indorsement to any subsequent holder who takes the instru-
ment in good faith that (a) he has good title to the instrument . . ." By
interpreting "holder" literally, a subsequent transferee of an instrument bear-
ing a forged indorsement, not being a holder,10 4 is not entitled to the trans-
feror's warranty of good title from any person other than his immediate
transferor.10 5 For instance, assume that A makes a note payable to B. C
forges B's indorsement and transfers the note to D. D indorses the note to E
who then indorses it to F. Even though F may have relied upon D's indorse-
ment, since F is not a subsequent "holder," D makes no warranty to him.
99. U.C.C. § 3-404 provides in part:
(1) Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of the person whose name is
signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded from denying it; but it operates as the signature
of the unauthorized signer in favor of any person who in good faith pays the instrument
or takes it for value.
100. F. BEUTEL, supra note 55, at 456-60.
101. Trust Company v. Port Terminal & Warehousing Co., 153 Ga. App. 735, 266 S.E.2d 259
(1980); Mott Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 259 N.W.2d 667, 23 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
104 (N.D. 1977); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 98 Wis. 2d 474, 297 N.W.2d 46
(1980); Empire Moving & Warehouse Corp. v. Hyde Park Bank & Trust Co., 20 U.C.C. REP.
SERv. 480 (1976). See also Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d
920, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1978).
102. See supra note 79.
103. Koerner & Lambert v. Allstate Ins. Co., 374 So. 2d 179 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
104. See supra note 81.
105. U.C.C. § 3-417 comments 7, 8.
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Thus F must sue E who is then required to sue D. D suffers the loss in the end,
but two law suits are required. If E is insolvent, because F has no cause of
action against D, F must suffer the loss.
Clearly, F should not be made to suffer the loss. F reasonably relied upon
D's indorsement of the note. E's insolvency should not shift the loss from D to
F. The drafters do not seem to have intended to deny F recovery against D.10 6
Comment 8 to section 3-417 states: "Where there is an indorsement the war-
ranty runs with the instrument and the remote holder may sue the indorser-
warrantor directly and thus avoid a multiplicity of suits which might be inter-
rupted by the insolvency of an intermediate transferor." Although the com-
ment again refers to "holders," it is probable, as in the case of section 3-406,
that the drafters intended to limit protection to those subsequent transferees
holding under the chain of title running through the indorser-warrantor. The
word "holder," except in the case of a breach of the warranty of good title,
does describe correctly the newly intended beneficiaries of the transferor's
warranties. Although there is no mention of this issue in the comments to the
present or to earlier drafts 10 7 of this section, there was substantial discussion
whether a subsequent holder should be able to proceed against a prior in-
dorser. These comments indicate that the drafters intended to extend the class
of persons entitled to the benefits of the warranties of indorsers and not to
limit them.108
Finally, the definition of "holder" 1°9 itself is technically inaccurate since
it denies "holder" status to a payee of a note or thief or finder of a note paya-
ble to bearer when there has been no delivery. Although non-delivery is a
defense against any person not having the rights of a holder in due course, 10
holders in due course take free of the defense of non-delivery."II As one of the
necessary steps in effecting this distinction, the drafters provided that a person
may become a holder in due course even when there has been no delivery.' 12
A "holder" is a person who is in possession of "an instrument drawn [or] is-
sued. . . to him or his order or to bearer or in blank."'1 3 As long as a person
has possession of the instrument, and it is drawn to his order, or to bearer or in
blank, he is the holder. There is no requirement that the instrument be deliv-
106. See U.C.C., Notes and Comments to Article III, at 36 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,
1948).
107. Id.
108. U.C.C. § 3-417, comment 8; U.C.C., Notes and Comments to Article Ill, at 36 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1948).
109. "Holder" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(20) as "a person who is in possession of a docu-
ment of title or an instrument or a certificated investment security drawn, issued, or indorsed to
him or his order or to bearer or in blank."
110. U.C.C. § 3-306(C).
I11. Id. § 3-305(2).
112. The drafters clearly intended to enable a person to become a holder even though there
has been no delivery of the instrument to him. U.C.C., Notes and Comments to Article Ill, at 147
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1946). Although a thief or finder of an instrument payable to bearer has
not taken for value and has notice of the owner's claim of ownership and thereby can not be a
holder in due course, a person to whom the thief or finder has negotiated the instrument can very
possibly fulfill the requirements for holder in due course status established in U.C.C. § 3-302(1).
113. U.C.C. § 1-201(20).
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ered to him.' 14 A payee of a check or other draft thus can be a holder since he
would be in possession of a draft drawn to his order. But neither a payee in
possession of an undelivered note nor a finder of a note payable to bearer is
technically a holder. A note is "made" and not "drawn" and therefore it is not
drawn to his order or to bearer. Since the note was not delivered, it was not
"issued" to his order or to bearer. It is extremely unlikely that the drafters
intended to make this distinction. The word "drawn" in section 1-201(20)
should be read as "drawn or made."
2. "Paid"
Neither the term "pays" nor any of its derivative forms (Le., "paid,"
"payor," or "payment") is defined in the U.C.C. Yet these terms form the
foundation for several important provisions of Article 3.115 The omission of a
definition would not necessarily create a problem if the drafters used the term
consistently throughout Article 3. But it is impossible to find one definition
that would be satisfactory for all uses of the term.
Under section 3-603(2), "Payment or satisfaction may be made with the
consent of the holder by any person including a stranger to the instrument.
Surrender of the instrument to such a person gives him the rights of a trans-
feree (section 3-201)." The payor is, upon his payment and surrender of the
instrument, thereby given the rights of a transferee." 6 The comments to an
earlier draft of this section make it clear that the payor gets all of the rights of
any ordinary transferee:
If there is an indorsement by the holder, it is a simple case of
negotiation and the payer [sic] becomes himself a holder. If there is
no indorsement but the payer [sic] receives the instrument, his posi-
tion is the same as that of a transferee without indorsement under
Section 28 [3-201]. 117
These rights would seem to include the transferor's warranties under sec-
tion 3-417(2). Under section 3-417(2)(b), "Any person who transfers an instru-
ment and receives consideration warrants to his transferee and if the transfer is
by indorsement to any subsequent holder who takes the instrument in good
faith that (b) all signatures are genuine or authorized."
Section 3-603(2) does not exclude by its terms payment by a drawee,
drawer or maker. But if payment by any of these parties is to be included
within section 3-603(2), these parties would be given a warranty by the person
paid about the genuineness of the signature of drawer and maker. In so doing,
114. See supra note 112.
115. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-603(1) & (2); id § 3-419(1)(c); i d § 3-418; id 3-417(1); i d § 3-406.
116. Jacobson v. FDIC, 407 F. Supp. 821 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Griffin v. Griffin, 250 Ark. 845,
467 S.W.2d 737 (1971); Collection Control Bureau v. Weiss, 50 Cal. App. 2d 865, 123 Cal. Rptr.
625 (1975); Ertel v. Radio Corp., 297 N.E.2d 446 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973); Citizens Fidelity Bank and
Trust Co. v. Stark, 431 S.W.2d 722 (Ky. 1968); Commercial Sav. Bank v. G. and J. Wood Prods.
Co., 46 Mich. 133, 207 N.W.2d 401 (1973); Simson v. Bilderbeck, Inc., 76 N.M. 667, 417 P.2d 803
(1966); Eikel v. Bristow Corp., 529 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); U.C.C. § 3-603(2).
117. U.C.C., Notes and Comments to Article III, at 101 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1947).
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the specific allocation of loss for payment over the unauthorized signatures of
the drawer or maker established in section 3-417(l)(b) and section 3-418
would be circumvented. Section 3-417(1) together with section 3-418 codifies
the doctrine of Price v. Neal 118 under which the drawee assumes the risk of
payment over the forged signature of the drawer.1 9 These sections extend the
doctrine to include payment by the maker or drawer.' 20 To provide for this
result, section 3-418 makes payment final in favor of a holder in due course
and a person who has in good faith relied on the payment.' 21 Finality under
section 3-418 is subject only 122 to the presenter's warranties under section 3-
417(1), which do not include the warranty that all signatures are genuine or
authorized but only the warranty that the warrantor has no knowledge that the
signature of the drawer or maker is unauthorized. 123 As a consequence, "pay-
ment" in U.C.C. section 3-603(2) should be read as excluding payment by a
drawee, drawer, or maker.
The question whether a drawee, drawer, or maker should be entitled to
the rights of a transferee is not the only ambiguity involving the term "pays."
Questions also arise about the precise relationship between the holder and a
stranger who makes payment to him. Section 3-603(2) itself is fairly clear in
stating that when a stranger makes payment to the holder the holder is deemed
to have transfered the instrument to him.124 Thus, the holder gives him trans-
feror's warranties under section 3-417. As a consequence, loss from payment
by the stranger over a forgery of the maker's or drawer's signature rests upon
the holder and not the stranger. Unfortunately, there are indications in both
sections 3-417(1) and 3-418 that the loss is to fall on the stranger instead.
Comment 1 to section 3-418 states: "The rule stated in the section [as to final-
ity of payment] is not limited to drawees, but applies equally to the maker of a
note or anyparty who pays an instrument."' 125 An earlier draft of section 3-
417(1), in describing the beneficiaries of the presenter's warranties, used the
phrase "party who in good faith pays."' 126 This phrase was changed in the
official version to "person who in good faith pays." This change can only be
explained if, for purposes of section 3-418 and section 3-417(1), payment may
be made by a non-party, or in other words, a stranger to the instrument.' 27 If
the stranger was entitled already to the warranties in section 3-417(2), it would
be superfluous to treat him as a payor under section 3-418 and section 3-
417(1), which has the sole intended affect of limiting the warranties otherwise
118. 97 Eng. Rep. 871, 3 Burr. 1354 (K.B. 1762).
119. U.C.C. §3-418 comment 1.
120. Id.
121. Id. § 3-418.
122. Id.; id comment 5. The finality of payment is also subject to recovery of provisional
payments made under U.C.C. § 4-301. This exception is not relevant to the issue discussed in the
text above.
123. U.C.C. § 3-417(1)(b); id. § 3-417 comment 4.
124. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
125. Emphasis added.
126. U.C.C. § 3-417(1) (Official Draft 1952).
127. 2 STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 35, at 1075.
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available under section 3-417(2).128 There are also policy reasons to impose
this risk of forgery of the drawer's or maker's signature upon the payor-stran-
ger and not the holder. If the holder wants to obtain payment and a stranger,
to accommodate the drawer or maker, makes payment, why should the holder
be deprived of the opportunity to discover immediately whether his signature
is genuine? Had he presented the instrument to the drawer or maker directly
and obtained payment, he would not have had to bear the risk of their unau-
thorized signature.' 29 When payment is made by a prior party to the instru-
ment other than an irregular indorser, 130 and not by a stranger, the holder
does not bear this risk. A prior party, other than an irregular indorser, will
have warranted to the holder that all signatures are genuine.131 Therefore, if
the prior party sues the holder for breach of his transferor's warranty, the
holder may counterclaim against the prior party on his transferor's warranty
to the holder. A stranger or irregular indorser does not make any warranties
to the holder.' 32 Therefore, the holder bears this risk only when he agrees to
receive payment from a stranger or an irregular indorser, and not when pay-
ment is made by a prior party.
The inconsistency of allocation of loss that exists when a stranger pays the
holder seems to have resulted from the attempt of the drafters to remedy two
very different problems in the same section. Section 3-603(2) was intended to
deal with two specific problems.133 The first problem concerned a practice
that originated under the pre-N.I.L common law called "payment for honor."
As continued in the N.I.L.,134 upon dishonor and protest 135 any person could
pay a draft and, if he followed the required formalities, 136 could be subrogated
to the rights of the party paid.13 7 The drafters recognized that the practice was
obsolete because of the cumbersome formalities that had to be followed.
138
The drafters noted that parties had stopped using this practice and began in-
stead to arrange to have a prior party pay the instrument and take the indorse-
ment of the holder.' 39 They saw no reason why a stranger, rather than a
party, should not be able to pay off the holder, as could be done by a payment
for honor, and then step into the holder's shoes. 140 At the same time the draft-
ers wanted to solve the problem of an accommodation indorser who, under
some decisions, had been denied the right to recover against the party accom-
128. U.C.C. § 4-207 comment 4.
129. Payment would have been final. U.C.C. § 3-418; id. comment 1.
130. An irregular indorser, one whose indorsement is not in the chain of title, does not "trans-
fer" the instrument and therefore does not give the transferor's warranty under U.C.C. § 3-
417(2)(b) that all signatures are genuine or authorized. Id. § 3-414 comment 2.
131. U.C.C. § 3-417(2)(b).
132. See supra note 130.
133. See supra text accompanying note 117.
134. N.I.L. §§ 171-77.
135. Id § 171.
136. Id §§ 172-73.
137. Id § 175.
138. U.C.C., Notes and Comments to Article III, at 101 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1947).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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modated after his payment to the holder.141 Section 3-603(2) attempted to
solve both of these problems at one time by providing that payment may be
made by any person and that upon surrender of the instrument the payor ob-
tains the rights of a transferee. What the drafters overlooked was that in every
one of those situations, the holder himself and all intervening parties between
himself, the reacquiring party, 142 or the party accommodated or the party for
whose honor payment was made, 143 were discharged. The payor stepped into
the shoes of the holder only as to the holder's rights as against the party whose
benefit payment had been made and parties prior thereto. 144 Thus, the risk of
loss from a forgery of the drawer's or maker's signature was not imposed upon
the holder, who had been discharged, but upon the party making payment.
Under section 3-603(2) when a stranger acquires the instrument, none of these
parties are discharged. The stranger steps into the shoes of the holder as to all
parties and not just as to the party for whose benefit payment had been made
and parties prior thereto. The apparent inconsistency between section 3-418
and section 3-603(2) makes it extremely difficult for a court to determine the
result intended by the drafters. By applying a code methodology a court could
reach either of these two conflicting results depending upon whether they be-
gan their analysis with section 3-603(2) or section 3-418.
3. "Value"
The term "value" is used in several sections of Article 3. For a holder to
qualify as a holder in due course, section 3-302(l)(a) requires that the holder
take for value. Under section 3-201(3) a transferee of an unindorsed instru-
ment payable to order or specially indorsed must give value in order to ac-
quire the right to compel his transferor to indorse the instrument. In addition,
under section 3-415(2) an accommodation party is liable in the capacity in
which he has signed only when the instrument has been taken for value before
it is due.
The U.C.C. contains two definitions of "value." In the general provisions
of Article 1, section 1-201(44) defines "value" as including "any consideration
sufficient to support a simple contract." Section 3-303, on the other hand,
states that a holder takes the instrument for value only "to the extent that the
agreed consideration has been performed .... ',145 The primary distinction
between the two definitions of value is that under section 1-201(44) an execu-
tory promise is value while under section 3-303(a) it is not. For determining
whether a holder has taken for value to qualify as a holder in due course, the
definition of "value" found in section 3-303 and not the one in section 1-
201(44) applies. Section 3-302 explicitly contains a cross reference to section
3-303. Similarly, the comments to section 3-303 indicate that the section was
141. Id. at 101-02.
142. U.C.C. § 3-208.
143. N.I.L. § 175.
144. W. BnrroN, supra note 70, at 607.
145. U.C.C. § 3-303(a).
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drafted for determining whether a holder is in due course and specifically state
that a holder who has taken only for an executory promise is not a holder in
due course. 146
Neither section 3-201(3) nor section 3-415(2) indicate in their text, com-
ments, or definitional cross-references which definition was intended to apply.
An examination of section 1-201(44) and section 3-303 does not disclose any
conclusive answer either. The comments to section 1-201(44) do state that sec-
tion 1-201(44) does not apply to Article 3.147 On the other hand, by its terms,
section 3-303 applies only when "a holder takes the instrument for value
... .,14s In section 3-201(3) the transferee is, by definition, not a holder.
Under section 3-415(2) the taker does not necessarily have to be a holder.
Similarly, all of the comments to section 3-303, except one,14 9 indicate that its
specific provisions were drafted to deal with the problem whether a holder
qualifies as a holder in due course. Comment 1 to section 3-303 does refer to
accommodation parties but gives no real indication whether section 3-303 is
applicable to section 3-415(2).15o Furthermore, the policies underlying section
3-303(a) are not at stake in section 3-201(3) or section 3-415(2). Permitting an
executory promise to qualify as value would not undermine the purpose of
either section. The comments to section 3-201(3) state that the section "applies
only to the transfer for value of an instrument payable to order or specially
indorsed. It has no application to a gift. . ." 151 Permitting only a transferee
for value to compel an indorsement of his transferor seems to serve the pur-
pose of relieving any transferor who has given an instrument as a gift from
being required to indorse the gratuitously given instrument and thereby risk
incurring liability as an indorser to a holder in due course. That the promise
has not yet been performed does not seem to rebut the presumption that in
bargaining for the instrument the transferee and transferor intended that the
transferee receive an instrument that he could negotiate further. In other
words, the transferee, after making a promise that could be enforced by the
transferor, has every reason to expect a freely negotiable instrument. Similarly,
the requirement in section 3-415(2) that an instrument be taken for value
before it is due is an effort to incorporate into Article 3 the defense found in
the general law of suretyship that "the obligation of the surety is terminated at
the [date the instrument is due] unless in the meantime the obligation of the
principal has become effective."' 152 The principal's obligation is effective once
the principal receives consideration. The consideration need not be per-
146. Id § 3-303 comment 3.
147. Id § 1-201 comment 44.
148. Emphasis added.
149. U.C.C. § 3-303 comment 1.
150. U.C.C. § 3-303 comment 1 provides:
The original Section 26 which had reference to the liability of accommodation parties is
omitted as erroneous and misleading, since a holder who does not himself give value
cannot qualify as a holder in due course in his own right merely because value has
previously been given for the instrument.
151. U.C.C. § 3-201 comment 6.
152. Id § 3-415 comment 3; W. BRrrrON, supra note 70, at 600-02.
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formed. The term "value," rather than consideration, seems to have been used
in sections 3-415(2) and 3-201(3) for the purpose of ensuring that a pre-ex-
isting debt, which is not usually deemed to be consideration, would be suffi-
cient to uphold the surety's promise and the transferor's duty to indorse. This
purpose is satisfied by using the definition in section 1-201(44), since preexist-
ing debt is value under both section 1-201(44)153 and section 3-303.154 Fi-
nally, the N.I.L. did make a distinction between the requirements for value for
holder in due course status and for other purposes. Value was defined gener-
ally to include even executory promises. 155 But a holder who received notice
before paying the full amount agreed to be paid was only a holder in due
course to the extent of the amount paid prior to receiving the notice.1 56 The
drafters wanted to ensure that a holder could only be a holder in due course to
the extent that he performed his promise, thus they consolidated the two
N.I.L. sections into one. But this does not evidence an intention to change the
rules under the N.I.L. that defined what constituted value for other uses of the
term "value."
B. Many Rules Supplement, Rather than Preempt, the Common Law
As already noted, one of the primary objectives of the drafters of the
U.C.C. was to eliminate the need for substantial case law research in order to
answer common questions of commercial law.'57 The drafters intended that
practitioners be able to discern most of these answers from the U.C.C. alone.
The U.C.C. has been held out as enabling a practitioner to do this.158 But a
practitioner cannot discern the answer to many of his commercial paper ques-
tions by reference to Article 3 alone because several sections of Article 3 do
not attempt to state comprehensively the rules governing their particular area.
Rather, these sections merely state a few specific rules resolving the particular
questions on which courts under the N.I.L. were in conflict.159 For the general
rules intended to govern, reference must be made to the common law of the
particular jurisdiction. Allowing judges to decide these issues as questions of
common law tends to destroy uniformity between the states and certainty of
results within states. To add to the problem, the drafters did not indicate
which sections were intended to preempt and which were meant only to sup-
plement the common law. In most instances, though, a careful analysis of the
sections themselves and the specific problems under the N.I.L. they were in-
tended to solve will disclose whether the section was intended to be
preemptive.
153. U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(b).
154. Id § 3-303(b).
155. N.I.L. § 25.
156. Id § 54.
157. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
159. See Beutel, supra note 59, at 353.
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1. Conversion
One of the clearest examples of a section that merely supplements rather
than preempts the common law is section 3-419, which lists three situations in
which an instrument has been converted. Under section 3-419(1):
An instrument is converted when (a) a drawee to whom it is deliv-
ered for acceptance refuses to return it on demand; or (b) any person
to whom it is delivered for payment refuses on demand either to pay
or return it; or (c) it is paid on a forged indorsement.
Use of the words "[a]n instrument is converted when," gives the impres-
sion that what follows is a comprehensive list of all acts that constitute conver-
sion of an instrument.' 60 But closer inspection reveals that this is not the case.
To begin with, section 3-419 itself implicitly acknowledges that there are acts
of conversion that are not listed in section 3-419(1). Both sections 3-419(3)
and (4) provide that certain acts by designated persons do not constitute con-
version. Yet none of these acts are listed in section 3-419(1) as a conversion of
the instrument.161 If section 3-419(1) were intended to be comprehensive, sec-
tions 3-419(3) and (4) would be superfluous. Section 3-419(3) provides that an
agent is not liable for conversion beyond the proceeds remaining in his hands
when he deals with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who is not
the true owner of the instrument if he has acted in good faith and in accord-
ance with the reasonable commercial standards of his business. 62 But the
agent is not liable for conversion under section 3-419(1), even when he fails to
act in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of his business. 163
Similarly, section 3-419(4) provides that an intermediary bank or a payor bank
that is not also a depositary bank is not liable for conversion for failing to pay
or to apply the proceeds of an instrument restrictively indorsed consistently
with the indorsement of an indorser other than its immediate transferor. 164
Yet section 3-419(1) does not make the failure to pay or to apply the proceeds
of an instrument in a manner consistent with a restrictive indorsement a con-
160. 2 STATE OF NEW YotK, supra note 35, at 1082.
161. Id.
162. U.C.C. § 3-419(3) provides:
Subject to the provisions of this Act concerning restrictive indorsements a representative,
including a depositary or collecting bank, who has in good faith and in accordance with
the reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business of such representative
dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was not the true owner is
not liable in conversion or otherwise to the true owner beyond the amount of any pro-
ceeds remaining in his hands.
163. Clearly, U.C.C. § 3-419(1)(a) & (b) are inapplicable to an agent obtaining payment. Al-
though it could be argued that a purchaser has "paid" the instrument and is therefore liable under
U.C.C. § 3-419(l)(c), this argument is weak. First "paid" in its most expansive reading probably
includes an indorser who takes the instrument up, but it is hard to see how it could be stretched to
include a purchaser before maturity. Furthermore, if the agent was involved in the sale but not in
the purchase of the instrument, the agent certainly would not have "paid" the instrument.
164. U.C.C. § 3-419(4) provides:
An intermediary bank or payor bank which is not a depositary bank is not liable in
conversion solely by reason of the fact that proceeds of an item indorsed restrictively
(Sections 3-205 and 3-206) are not paid or applied consistently with the restrictive in-
dorsement of an indorser other than its immediate transferor.
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version. There are, in addition, many other acts that clearly constitute conver-
sion which likewise are not listed in section 3-419(1). For instance, theft of a
negotiable instrument must be an act of conversion. 165 Similarly, sale of a
stolen instrument, at least by one with notice of the theft, must be an act of
conversion. 166 It is extremely doubtful that the drafters intended to deny the
true owner an action for conversion against these parties. If section 3-419(1)
were intended to be exclusive, however, no such actions would lie.
From an examination of the law of conversion under the N.I.L. and the
comments to the present and prior drafts of section 3-419, it becomes clear that
section 3-419(1) was not intended to be a comprehensive list of all acts of
conversion. The N.I.L. did not contain any rules for conversion. The law of
conversion was left to the common law. 167 Dean William Prosser, the Re-
porter for Article 3, was, as a noted authority on torts, obviously very familiar
with the law of conversion. Seeing no need to state the entire law of conver-
sion in section 3-419, he simply decided to set out the particular changes that
the drafters desired to institute while leaving the remainder of the law of con-
version to be incorporated into Article 3 by virtue of section 1-103.168 Thus,
section 3-419(l)(a) was included because a drawee who refused to return upon
demand an instrument delivered for acceptance was not liable for conversion
under the N.I.L., but was deemed to have constructively accepted the instru-
ment. 169 The drafters wanted to eliminate the doctrine of constructive accept-
ance and instead to impose liability on the basis of conversion. 170 Subsection
(1)(b) was added simply to extend the rule of (1)(a) to instruments delivered
for payment rather than for acceptance. 171 Finally, section 3-419(l)(c) was in-
tended to resolve a conflict in the common law whether payment on a forged
indorsement by the drawee or an indorser who takes up the instrument was
conversion. 172
Unfortunately section 3-419 gives no indication about which particular
rules of the common law of conversion are displaced by Article 3. A court is
faced with the difficult task of ensuring that its decision does not conflict with
the policies underlying other sections of Article 3. For example, a holder in
due course of a stolen note payable to bearer takes free of all claims of owner-
ship.173 A court would be undercutting this policy decision if it made the
holder in due course liable to the original owner for conversion. On the other
165. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 81, 82-84 (4th ed. 1971).
166. Id. at 87.
167. 2 STATE OF NEW YORK, su.pra note 35, at 1082.
168. Id.; see also Commercial Credit Corp. v. University Nat'l Bank, 590 F.2d 849, 852 (10th
Cir. 1979).
169. U.C.C. § 3-419 comment 1; U.C.C., Notes and Comments to Article III, at 91 (Tentative
Draft No. 3, 1947).
170. U.C.C. § 3-419 comment 1; U.C.C., Notes and Comments to Article Ill, at 91 (Tentative
Draft No. 3, 1947).
171. U.C.C., Notes and Comments to Article III, at 40 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1948).
172. U.C.C. § 3-419 comment 3; U.C.C., Notes and Comments to Article III, at 41 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1948); W. BRITTON, supra note 70, at 418-22.
173. U.C.C. § 3-305(1).
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hand, if the holder is not in due course, he takes subject to all valid claims of
ownership. 174 Therefore a court would not offend any policy found in Article
3 if it held such a person liable for conversion. Yet the court cannot rely sim-
ply upon section 3-306 for its answer since that section gives no insight into
whether a prior holder of a stolen bearer instrument should be liable to the
true owner for conversion. Similarly, section 3-306 gives no indication
whether a person not having the rights of a holder in due course should be
liable for conversion when he sells an instrument with knowledge of an equita-
ble claim of ownership. It is clear that a payor who pays an instrument with
knowledge of a legal or equitable claim of ownership should be liable for con-
version only when he is not entitled to a discharge under section 3-603(l).175
For instance, a maker who pays the holder with knowledge of an equitable
claim of ownership is liable for conversion to the true owner only when the
owner either properly indemnified the payor or obtained an injunction.
2. Defenses of Accommodation Parties
An accommodation party is a person who signs an instrument "for the
purpose of lending his name to another party to it."'17 6 An accommodation
party, to put it another way, is a surety 177 who evidences his liability by sign-
ing an instrument that the party he is accommodating has signed also. 178
When a person has signed as an accommodation party, there are two separate
transactions underlying the obligations evidenced by the instrument: (1) the
agreement between the accommodation and the accommodated parties under
which the accommodation party agrees to act as such; and (2) the transaction
out of which the obligation of the accommodated party to the creditor arose
for which obligation the instrument was given. The accommodation party
174. Id. § 3-306(a).
175. Id. § 3-603(1) provides:
The liability of any party is discharged to the extent of his payment or satisfaction to the
holder even though it is made with knowledge of a claim of another person to the instru-
ment unless prior to such payment or satisfaction the person making the claim either
supplies indemnity deemed adequate by the party seeking the discharge or enjoins pay-
ment or satisfaction by order of a court of competent jurisdiction in an action in which
the adverse claimant and the holder are parties. This subsection does not, however, re-
sult in the discharge of the liability
(a) of a party who in bad faith pays or satisfies a holder who acquired the instru-
ment by theft or who (unless having the rights of a holder in due course) holds
through one who so acquired it; or
(b) of a party (other than an intermediary bank or a payor bank which is not a
depositary bank) who pays or satisfies the holder of an instrument which has
been restrictively indorsed in a manner not consistent with the terms of such
restrictive indorsement.
176. U.C.C. § 3-415(l); see Wilmot v. Central Okla. Gravel Corp., 620 P.2d 1350 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1980); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Marshall, 551 P.2d 315 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
177. The RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 82 (1937) defines suretyship as "the relation which
exists where one person has undertaken an obligation and another person is also under an obliga-
tion or other duty to the obligee, who is entitled to but one performance, and as between the two
who are bound, one rather than the other should perform."
178. U.C.C. § 3-415(1). See Bank of America v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. App. 3d 435, 84 Cal.
Rptr. 421 (1970); McIntosh v. White, 447 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); Bucks County Bank &
Trust Co. v. DeGroot, 226 Pa. Super. 419, 313 A.2d 357 (1973).
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may have defenses he would like to assert arising out of one or both of these
transactions.
Determining which defenses the accommodation party may raise appears
to require reference to rules other than those contained in Article 3. This be-
comes evident when one tries to apply the code sections that appear to be
relevant. Section 3-415(2) sets out the contract of the accommodation party:
"When the instrument has been taken for value before it is due the accommo-
dation party is liable in the capacity in which he has signed even though the
taker knows of the accommodation." Thus, as long as value has been given
for the instrument before it is due, the accommodation party is liable in
whatever capacity he has signed (ie., drawer, maker, acceptor or indorser).' 79
Assume that A agreed to purchase a car from C. C demands that B guaranty
repayment by indorsing the note. A makes a note payable to C which is in-
dorsed by B. Since the car constitues value, the instrument has been taken for
value before it is due. B is therefore liable as an indorser, which is the capacity
in which he signed. As an indorser, B's promise to pay the instrument is con-
ditioned, under the indorser's contract, upon dishonor of the instrument by A
and upon any necessary notice of dishonor.180
Section 3-414(1), which sets forth the indorser's contract, does not dictate
what defenses an indorser may raise. To determine what defenses are avail-
able, section 3-305 and section 3-306 must be consulted. Section 3-415(2), with
one exception, does not attempt to spell out which defenses an accommodation
party may raise. The comments to section 3-415 expressly make reference to
the "provisions subjecting one not a holder in due course to all simple contract
defenses."'' The one exception is that the "obligation of the accommodation
party is supported by any consideration for which the instrument is taken
before it is due."' 82 Thus, B in our example may not raise lack of considera-
tion as a defense against C, even if A gave no consideration to B.'8 3
179. U.C.C. § 3-415 comment 1; Oak Park Currency Exch., Inc. v. Maropoulos, 48 111. App. 3d
437, 363 N.E.2d 54 (1977); Nevada State Bank v. Fischer, 93 Nev. 317, 565 P.2d 332 (1977); First
Nat'l Bank v. Linn, 282 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 1981).
180. U.C.C. § 3-414(1). See also supra note 179.
181. U.C.C. § 3-415 comment 1.
182. Id § 3-415 comment 3. Although this exception is not spelled out in the text of U.C.C.
§ 3-415, the comments to the section clearly indicate that the drafters intend U.C.C. § 3-415(2) to
be read as including this defense.
183. U.C.C. § 3-415 comment 3; Gavin v. Hinrichs, 375 So. 2d 1063 (Ala. 1979); Bank of
America v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. App. 3d 435, 84 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1970); Fairfield County Trust
Co. v. Steinbrecher, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 405, 255 A.2d 144 (1968); Seaboard Fin. Co. v. Dorman, 4
Conn. Cir. Ct. 154, 227 A.2d 441 (1966); Motz v. Landmark First Nat'l Bank, 154 Ga. App. 858,
270 S.E.2d 81 (1980); Burke v. Burke, 89 IlM. App. 3d 826, 412 N.E.2d 204 (1980); Stockwell v.
Bloomfield State Bank, 174 Ind. App. 307, 367 N.E.2d 42 (1977); Turfers, Inc. v. Frederick Prod.
Credit Ass'n, 265 Md. 679, 291 A.2d 643 (1972); Berger v. Norad Enters., Inc. 6 U.C.C. REP. SnRv.
161 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969); Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Eurez Constr. Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 499, 301
N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 1969)(mem.); First Nat'l City Bank v. Valentine, 61 Misc. 2d 554, 306
N.Y.S.2d 227, 7 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 53 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Delbrook Assocs., Inc. v. Law, 4 U.C.C.
REP. SERV. 88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); Abby Fin. Corp. v. Weydig Auto Supplies Unlimited, Inc., 4
U.C.C. REP. SERV. 858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); Shulman v. Steve Lynn, Inc., 2 U.C.C. RnP. SERV.
1046 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); Hybertsen v. Reimann, 262 Or. 116, 496 P.2d 917 (1972)(en banc);
James Talcott, Inc. v. Fred Ratowsky Assocs., Inc., 84 Dauph. 258,38 Pa. D. & C.2d 624,2 U.C.C.
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Suppose, though, B had indorsed and delivered the note to A for the spe-
cial purpose of enabling A to pay his college tuition. If the note is used to
purchase a car instead, should this furnish a defense to B against C? Under
section 3-306(c), delivery for a special purpose is a defense against a person
not having the rights of a holder in due course. A literal application of section
3-306(c) would make this defense available against C if he is not a holder in
due course. But if C is unaware of this special purpose, C's reasonable expec-
tations would be defeated if he were subjected to this defense. As was the rule
under the N.I.L.,' 8 4 courts under Article 3 have held that such a defense is not
available against any taker who at the time he took the instrument was una-
ware of the condition or special purpose. 185 When the taker knew of the spe-
cial purpose, however, his reasonable expectations have not been defeated.
Under the N.I.L., the holder therefore took subject to the defense.' 8 6 One
would expect that most courts under Article 3 would similarly hold. 187 But
under section 3-306 no distinction is made between takers with notice of a
condition or special purpose and takers without notice. It would therefore
appear that either the defense would be available against both holders with
and without notice of the special purpose or it would be available against
neither type of holder. Since section 3-306 was not drafted with accommoda-
tion parties in mind, it cannot be expected to deal satisfactorily with this issue.
The rule under the N.I.L. appears to make good sense and since there is no
indication that the drafters intended to reject these decisions, they probably
should be good law under Article 3.
A similar problem arises in determining whether the accommodation
party can raise the accommodated party's defenses arising out of the latter's
transaction with the creditor. When the accommodation party is sued on the
instrument by the creditor, he may want to set up the defense of failure of
consideration flowing to the accommodated party or some other defense of the
accommodated party arising from the underlying transaction with the creditor.
For instance, if A would have had the defense that C has breached the war-
ranty of merchantability had A been sued, can B raise this breach of warranty
as a defense to his own liability on the note? Under section 3-306(d), B techni-
cally cannot raise the defense since it is a defense of a third party. But since
the consideration running to A is deemed sufficient to support B's promise, B
should be permitted to raise at least the defense that there was a partial or total
failure of consideration to A.' 8 8 Even if section 3-306(d) were applied liter-
ally, B could still raise this defense under section 3-415(2), since the instrument
REP. SERV. 1134 (1965); Gill v. Commonwealth Nat'l Bank, 504 S.W.2d 521 (rex. Civ. App.
1973).
184. J. OGDEN, supra note 70, at 249-50.
185. Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Eurez Constr. Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 499, 301 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct.
1969); Delbrook Assocs., Inc. v. Law, 4 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
186. J. OGDEN, supra note 70, at 249.
187. But see Perfect Picture Frames, Inc. v. Consolidated Fine Arts, Ltd., 9 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
283 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) (not available even where holder knew of condition).
188. See McIntosh v. White, 447 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); Peters, Suretyship Under
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 833, 862-65 (1968).
1983]
NORTH CIROLINA LAW REVIEW
had not been taken "for value." But what about other defenses, such as mis-
take, misrepresentation, breach of warranty, or unconscionability? It does not
make any sense to permit C to recover from B when C could not have recov-
ered from A because of one of these defenses. But under section 3-306(d), B is
not permitted to raise these defenses of A. It could be argued that since the
consideration flowing to A is deemed to go also to B, B steps into A's shoes
and may raise any defense that A could. But this argument goes too far in the
other direction. Assume that A has the defense of infancy 189 or discharge in
bankruptcy. 190 Clearly B cannot be permitted to raise these defenses.' 91
Under the N.I.L., the accommodation party was denied the right to raise any
defense of the accommodated party the risk of which the creditor was attempt-
ing to shift to the accommodation party by the obtaining of his signature on
the instrument. 192 This would permit B to raise the former set of defenses but
not the latter. Is this still the law under Article 3? Since we do not know
precisely how the drafters intended to treat accommodation parties under sec-
tion 3-306, this question cannot be answered. Because accommodation parties
do not fit neatly within the scheme established by the drafters in section 3-305
and section 3-306, however, it would be dangerous to assume that the drafters
intended to displace the common-law rules with section 3-305 and section 3-
306.
3. Finality of Payment and Acceptance
When a person pays or accepts an instrument upon a mistaken belief
about the propriety of the payment or acceptance, a question arises whether
the payment may be recovered or the acceptance avoided. Subject to two ex-
ceptions, 193 payment or acceptance is final under section 3-418 in favor of a
holder in due course, or a person who has in good faith changed his position in
reliance on the payment. 194 When payment or acceptance is final, the pay-
ment may not be recovered by the payor' 95 nor the acceptance avoided by the
acceptor unless there is a breach of a presenter's warranty. 196
When payment is not final, there is no prohibition against its recovery by
the payor. But nothing in section 3-418 or in any other section of Article 3
affirmatively authorizes recovery of the payment. As under the N.I.L., the
ability of a payor to recover payments made by mistake must rest upon a
189. Murphy v. Bank of Dahlonega, 151 Ga. App. 264, 259 S.E.2d 670 (1979); Peters, supra
note 188, at 862.
190. Delbrook Assocs., Inc. v. Law, 4 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); Peters, supra
note 188, at 862.
191. See supra notes 189 and 190.
192. Peters, supra note 188, at 862.
193. The first exception is for the recovery, under U.C.C. § 4-301, of provisional payments
made by a bank. U.C.C. § 3-418 comment 5. The second exception is for breach of one of the
presenters warranties under U.C.C. § 3-417(1). Id § 3-418 comment 5.
194. U.C.C. § 3-418.
195. Id. comment 1.
196. 2 STATE OF NEw YORK, supra note 35, at 1073.
[Vol. 62
ARTICLE 3 METHODOLOGY
common-law right of restitution for monies paid under a mistake of fact. 197
No indication is given by the drafters whether section 3-418 is intended to
have any affect upon these common-law rules of restitution.198 For instance,
if the common law of a jurisdiction denies restitution when the mistaken pay-
ment is a result of the payor's negligence, is a negligent drawee denied restitu-
tion when he has paid an insufficient funds check to a person not having the
rights of a holder in due course?' 99
Even more troubling questions surround the ability of an acceptor to raise
defenses to his liability on an acceptance that is not final. No guidance is
given about whether the acceptor may only raise those defenses that would
constitute grounds for restitution had the instrument been paid rather ihan
accepted, or whether his ability to raise defenses is governed, like the liability
of all other parties, by section 3-306.200 As a result, courts are divided over
which of these answers is correct.201 The drafters seem to have focused on
common mistakes made by payor banks and completely neglected to provide
comprehensive rules governing the liability of acceptors.
C. Difficulty of Applying Article 3 to Unforeseen Situations
Learning from the problems with investment securities encountered
under the N.I.L., the drafters made Article 3 non-exclusive.20 2 Thus, courts or
legislatures can create negotiable instruments that do not comply with the re-
quirements for negotiability found in Article 3. But the drafters failed to fore-
see the problem with this new approach: any writing that does meet the
requirements of section 3-104 and is not expressly excluded under section 3-
103(1) is governed by Article 3. As a consequence, even when instruments
negotiable under Article 3 are used in transactions or for purposes different
from those foreseen when Article 3 was drafted, they are nonetheless governed
by the rules found in Article 3. Since the drafters made little effort to antici-
pate the possible new uses of negotiable instruments or possible changes in
commercial relationships, it was not long before courts were confronted with
the task of applying Article 3 to situations not anticipated by the drafters.
Courts were placed in a dilemma. Literal application of the rules would in
some of these situations defeat either public expectations or important social
policies. Since the drafters had not foreseen these situations, the balancing of
interests evidenced by the rules did not necessarily apply to these new situa-
tions. On the other hand, if the courts did not apply a rule to situations falling
197. 2 STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 35, at 1072-75; 3 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITU-
TION 290, 307-08 (1978).
198. See 3 G. PALMER, supra note 197, at 307-08.
199. For an affirmative answer to this question, see G. PALMER, supra note 197, at 307.
200. For a thorough discussion of this question, see Lawrence, Making Cashier's Checks and
Other Bank Checks Cost-Effective: A Plea For Revision ofArticles 3 and4 ofthe Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 64 MINN. L. REv. 275, 327-31 (1980).
201. Compare Rockland Trust Co. v. South Shore Nat'l Bank, 366 Mass. 74, 314 N.E.2d 438
(1974) (applying U.C.C. § 3-306) with Admiral Leather Corp. v. Manchester Modes, Inc., 422 F.
Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (mem.) (not applying U.C.C. § 3-306).
202. U.C.C. § 3-104 comment 1.
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literally within the rule, the ability of practitioners to rely upon the rule is
undermined.
Two substantial problems along these lines have already become appar-
ent: (1) the emergence of bank checks20 3 (ie., cashier's checks 2°4 and teller's
checks2°5) as cash substitutes, and (2) the changing relationships between con-
sumers and merchants.
1. Bank Checks
Although they were in use when Article 3 was drafted, there is no men-
tion in Article 3 of cashier's checks or teller's checks. 2°6 To the extent that
they are subject to the provisions of Article 3, they therefore are covered by the
same rules as personal checks. Thus a holder of a cashier's or teller's check, if
not a holder in due course, takes subject to all defenses of the issuer and any
third party claims of ownership.207 When the drafters decided to subject a
holder of a personal check or promissory note to all defenses of the obligor as
well as third party claims, they balanced the need to protect the drawer or
maker who has a defense arising from the underlying transaction with the
need to encourage the acceptance of negotiable instruments, which required
shielding a purchaser from the assertion of defenses that would defeat his right
to payment. The drafters concluded that in the case of ordinary negotiable
instruments, a person who does not have the rights of a holder in due course
should take subject to the defenses listed in section 3-306.
But bank checks are not viewed by the public as ordinary negotiable in-
struments. Rather, they are viewed more in the nature of cash.208 These
checks are usually purchased from the issuing bank for use in transactions in
which the payee, often a merchant, refuses to take a personal check from the
purchaser. These checks are accepted by merchants in lieu of cash for two
reasons: 1) the obligor (e.g. issuing bank on a teller's or cashier's check) is
almost always solvent; and (2) the merchant's belief that payment can not be
refused because of a defense of the obligor or of the remitter. 2°9 If section 3-
306 is deemed applicable to bank checks, the public's expectations will be dis-
203. Certified checks would also probably qualify as "bank checks." Unlike cashier's or
teller's checks, certified checks, being accepted drafts, are technically covered by U.C.C. § 3-418.
Thus, certified checks present slightly different, though similar, problems than do cashier's and
teller's checks. The specific issue is whether § 3-418 was intended to govern the question whether
the certifying bank can raise any defenses to its obligation to pay on the certification. This issue is
comprehensively discussed in Lawrence, supra note 200, at 320-33.
204. A cashier's check is a negotiable instrument drawn by a bank upon itself as dravee.
205. A teller's check is a check drawn by a bank, usually a savings and loan association, upon
a commercial bank. Thus, the drawer bank is not the drawee bank.
206. There is a reference to cashier's checks in U.C.C. § 4-211(1), which enumerates the types
of payment that collecting banks may take in settlement of an instrument for the payment of
money.
207. U.C.C. § 3-306.
208. See Lawrence, supra note 200, at 279-81. Traveller's checks are probably more consist-
ently accepted in lieu of cash than are bank checks. Traveller's checks, like certified checks, pres-
ent problems similar to bank checks. For a comprehensive discussion of traveller's checks, see
Hawkland, American Travellers Checks, 15 BUFF. L. REv. 501 (1966).
209. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 279-81.
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appointed. 210 A merchant who did not qualify as a holder in due course
would take subject to any defense the issuing bank had against the remitter
and any claim of ownership to the instrument asserted by the remitter. Even if
the merchant were a holder in due course, he may need to fight a law suit to
prove his status as such. Should a court find that section 3-306 applies to bank
checks or should it ignore the section and preserve the public's expectation by
denying the right of the issuer to raise any defenses to its obligation to pay?
Courts have differed greatly in their response to this question.211
Although cashier's and teller's checks appear to be treated similarly by
the public and by merchants, their treatment by the courts has been anything
but similar. Notwithstanding the public's expectations, most courts have
treated teller's checks like ordinary negotiable instruments, applying section 3-
306 to determine what defenses may be raised against a person not having the
rights of a holder in due course.212 Some courts have treated cashier's checks
in this manner.213 It is unclear whether these courts believe that cashier's and
teller's checks are like ordinary instruments or whether they felt compelled to
treat them like ordinary negotiable instruments on account of the absence of
any separate treatment of them under Article 3. In either case, possibly be-
cause of a nagging realization that the public does view bank checks as cash
substitutes, these courts have sought support for their decisions in any code
section that is even arguably applicable. In the case of cashier's checks, some
of these courts214 have found support in section 3-118(a): "[a] draft drawn on
the drawer is effective as a note." From this premise, they have reasoned that
since the ability of a maker to raise defenses is governed by section 3-305 and
section 3-306, these sections also govern the liability of the issuer of a cashier's
check. Section 3-118(a) was not intended to describe the defenses that may be
raised by an issuing bank on a cashier's check. Section 3-118(a) was intended
simply to dispense with the need to present to the drawee a draft drawn upon
the drawer or to give the drawer notice of the dishonor.215 Like a maker, the
210. See Lawrence, supra note 200, at 316-19.
211. See infra notes 212, 213, 219, and accompanying text.
212. Courts uniformly permit the drawer bank to raise any defense it has arising out of the
transaction in which the teller's check was issued as against any person not having the rights of a
holder in due course. Rubin v. Walt Whitman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 21 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 610
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Smith v. New York Bank for Sav., 11 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1210 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1973). There are two separate lines of decisions dealing with whether a drawer bank may raise
the purchaser's claims or defenses. One line applies § 3-306(d). See, e.g., Fulton Nat'l Bank v.
Delco Corp., 128 Ga. App. 16, 195 S.E.2d 455 (1973). The other line of cases, composed solely of
cases from New York, flatly prohibits the bank from raising any claims or defenses of the pur-
chaser. See Manhattan Imported Cars, Inc. v. Dime Say. Bank, 70 Misc. 2d 889, 335 N.Y.S.2d
356 (App. Term 1972) (per curiam); Meckler v. Highland Falls Say. & Loan Ass'n, 64 Misc. 2d
407, 314 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Ruskin v. Central Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 3 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 150 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); Maphrus v. Home Say. Bank, 44 Misc. 2d 705, 254 N.Y.S.2d 980
(Sup. Ct. 1965). See also Lawrence, supra note 200, at 333-39.
213. See, e.g., TPO Inc. v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1973); Banco Ganadero y Agricola v.
Society Nat'l Bank, 418 F. Supp. 520 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (mem.); Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v. City
Nat'l Bank, 33 Conn. Supp. 641, 365 A.2d 1222 (1976); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Delaware Auto
Sales, 271 A.2d 41 (Del. 1970); State Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 266 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 1978);
Thompson Poultry, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 199 Neb. 8, 255 N.W.2d 856 (1977).
214. See supra note 213.
215. U.C.C., Notes and Comments to Article III, § 14, at 62-3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1946).
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drawer is not harmed by a delay in presentment and has notice of dishonor
since he himself dishonors the draft. In the case of teller's checks, some courts
have found support in the sections that seem to hold that the order given by
the drawer bank to the drawee bank is revocable. 216 Under section 4-
104(l)(e), "customer" is specifically defined as including "a bank carrying an
account with another bank." Since under section 4-403, a "customer" has the
right to stop payment on any item payable for his account, these courts hold
that the drawer bank, once payment is stopped, can raise any defense that any
other drawer could raise.217 The right to stop payment simply resolves the
question whether the drawee bank must refuse to pay the instrument upon
request of the drawer. Granting the drawer bank this right to stop payment
does not evidence a judgment that the drawer bank should have the same right
to raise defenses as drawers on personal checks.218
On the other hand, many courts have treated cashier's checks as cash
equivalents and, as a consequence, have refused to permit the issuing bank to
raise any defenses to its obligation to pay even when the instrument is not held
by a holder in due course.219 But courts do not recognize straightforwardly
that the public treats cashier's checks differently than personal checks and
that, notwithstanding section 3-306, the bank must be precluded from raising
any defenses. Instead they have attempted to find support in code sections
that only superficially lend support to their analysis. For instance, many
courts state that a cashier's check is accepted by the act of its issuance.220
From this premise, they reason either that having been accepted it is irrevoca-
ble or that since a stop payment order is not effective after acceptance, a bank
may not raise any defense to its obligation to pay.221 Clearly the inability to
stop payment on an instrument does not answer the question whether the issu-
ing bank can raise its defenses once payment is refused.222 As indicated by
section 3-418, the fact that an instrument is accepted does not make it
irrevocable.223
It is a mistake for courts on either side of this issue to base their decision
216. Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Delco Corp., 128 Ga. App. 16, 195 S.E.2d 455 (1973).
217. Id.
218. See Lawrence, supra note 200, at 290-92.
219. See, e.g., Goldstein v. McLean Bank, 552 F.2d 1072, 1078 (4th Cir. 1977); Swiss Credit
Bank v. Virginia Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 587, 588 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Munson v. American
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 484 F.2d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 1973); Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
370 F. Supp. 276, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); State ex rel. Chan Siew Lai v. Powell, 536 S.W.2d 14, 16
(Mo. 1976) (en banc); National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, I ll N.J. Super. 347, 350, 268
A.2d 327, 329 (1970); Tranarg v. Banca Commerciale Italiana, 90 Misc. 2d 829, 835-36, 396
N.Y.S.2d 761, 764 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Moon Over the Mountain, Ltd. v. Marine Midland Bank, 87
Misc. 2d 918, 920, 386 N.Y.S.2d 974, 975 (Civ. Ct. 1976); Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank &
Trust, 495 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex. 1973).
220. See Munson v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 484 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1973); Kaufman
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); State ex rel. Chan Siew Lai v.
Powell, 536 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. 1976) (en banc); National Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111
N.J. Super. 347, 268 A.2d 327 (1970); Wertz v Richardson Heights Bank & Trust, 495 S.W.2d 572
(Tex. 1973).
221. See supra note 220.
222. See Lawrence, supra note 200, at 290-92.
223. See supra notes 193-201 and accompanying text.
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on superficially appropriate code provisions intended to resolve very different
problems. Courts are distracted thereby from the real question whether bank
checks should be treated differently than ordinary negotiable instruments. By
basing policy decisions on technical arguments, the court is hardpressed to
reach the same result when the technical argument is inapplicable. For in-
stance, teller's checks probably are treated just as much like cash as are cash-
ier's checks. Yet, if a court wanted to deny the drawer bank the right to raise a
defense to its obligation on a teller's check, it could not use the same argument
that it used in the case of cashier's checks, namely that the drawer cannot stop
payment once a check has been accepted.224 Courts would be better advised
to recognize that section 3-306 was not drafted with bank checks in mind and
that they must decide whether it is desirable to apply section 3-306 to such
checks.225
2. Consumer Protection
Even when Article 3 was being drafted, the pressing need to protect con-
sumers from overreaching by merchants had been recognized. Special rules
protecting consumers from such overreaching were being drafted in other Ar-
ticles of the U.C.C.226 For some reason, though, the drafters of Article 3 did
not provide any special rules for consumer transactions. They provided only
one set of rules which governed all transactions involving negotiable instru-
ments. It is doubtful that this failure to provide different rules for consumer
transactions evidenced a conscious decision by the drafters to treat consumer
transactions the same as business transactions. It is more likely that in at-
tempting to cure only those problems that had plagued the N.I.L., the drafters
simply failed to give substantial thought to the problem of consumers.
In drafting the sections setting forth the requirements for holder in due
course status, and in allowing such a holder to take free of all defenses, the
drafters probably had in mind a typical commercial transaction. The obligor
was pictured as choosing to give up his right to raise defenses in exchange for a
reduction in the cost of credit. On the other side of the transaction was pic-
tured an assignee of the instrument who, as an independent businessman, was
willing to assume the risk of the maker's insolvency but not willing to assume
the risk of non-payment on account of a maker's defense. If he was forced to
assume this latter risk, he would pay a lower price for the instrument. This
would require the seller to charge a higher price for the goods to obtain the
same net proceeds after selling the note. In formulating the requirements for
holder in due course status, the drafters made a substantial effort to avoid this
consequence, thereby encouraging the purchase of negotiable instruments at a
224. At least one court has expressly held that teller's checks are not to be treated like cashier's
checks especially because they are not accepted by their act of issuance and therefore the drawer
bank has the ight to stop payment. Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Delco Corp., 128 Ga. App. 16, 195
S.E.2d 455 (1973).
225. See generally Lawrence, supra note 200.
226. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-206(1); id. § 2-719(3).
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reasonable price. To accomplish this result, they defined both good faith
227
and notice228 in generally subjective terms. Thus, a purchaser may qualify as a
holder in due course as long as he subjectively acted in good faith, even
though a reasonable man may have suspected the existence of the defense. A
purchaser would be discouraged from purchasing instruments if juries, in
hindsight, could deny him holder in due course status by finding that the pur-
chaser should have known of the claim or defense.
In consumer transactions these underlying assumptions are often inaccu-
rate.229 A consumer usually is unaware that he is relinquishing his right to
raise defenses. Even when he is aware of the consequences of signing a negoti-
able instrument, his relinquishment of defenses may not have been bargained
for. On the other hand, the purchasers of consumer notes sometimes are re-
lated so closely to the merchant-payee that they have good reason to know of
the possibility that the consumer has a defense and are not relying upon his
right to take free of the defense in making their decision to purchase the in-
strument.230 Again courts were placed in a dilemma. If the court applied the
provisions of Article 3 literally, these purchasers would take free of the con-
sumer's defenses. But often this would be a miscarriage ofjustice. As a result,
many courts started to try to find ways to allow the consumer to raise his
defenses. As a general rule courts simply did not acknowledge that section 3-
305 was not drafted with consumer transactions in mind and thereby find that
even though the holder qualified as a holder in due course, he would take
subject to the consumer's defenses. 231 Instead, they manipulated the concepts
of "good faith" 232 and "notice" 233 by implying an objective element. But
these courts often did not limit their interpretation of these concepts to con-
sumer transactions.2 34 As a result, it is unclear whether these interpretations
are also applicable in non-consumer cases. Once a code section is misapplied
227. Id § 1-201 (19).
228. Id. § 1-201(25). Although there is an objective element to some extent in the definition of
"notice," id. § 1-201(25)(c), it is clear that to a great degree the drafters intended "notice" to be
interpreted subjectively. U.C.C., Notes and Comments to Article III, § 46, at 62 (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1947); U.C.C., Notes and Comments to Article III, § 43, at 162 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1946).
229. See Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969); Sullivan v. United
Dealers Corp., 486 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405
(1967); American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968).
230. See supra note 229.
231. Some courts did hold that even if a holder met all of the requirements contained in
U.C.C. § 3-302(1) for holder in due course status, the holder did not acquire the rights of a holder
in due course if he was "closely connected" to the payee. Sullivan v. United Dealers Corp., 486
S.W.2d 699 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972); American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 240 N.E.2d
886 (1968).
232. Mountain Fin. Co. v. Powell, 474 P.2d 172, 7 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1223 (Colo. Ct. App,
1970); Kennard v. Reliance, Inc., 257 Md. 654, 264 A.2d 832 (1970); General Inv. Corp. v. Ange-
lini, 58 N.J. 396, 278 A.2d 193 (1971).
233. United States Fin. Co. v. Jones, 229 So.2d 495 (Ala. 1969); Cromwell v. All State Credit
Corp., 10 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 403 (D.C. 1971); HIMC Inv. Co. v. Siciliano, 103 N.J. Super. 27, 246
A.2d 502 (1968).
234. United States Fin. Co. v. Jones, 229 So.2d 495 (Ala. 1969); Mountain Fin. Co. v. Powell,
474 P.2d 172, 7 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1223 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970); HIMC Inc. Co. v. Siciliano, 103
NJ. Super. 27, 246 A.2d 502 (1968).
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or stretched, even in an effort to reach a correct result, a practitioner can no
longer rely upon the results dictated by the code section. He never knows
when a court will stretch the language of a section to reach the desired result.
When a section is stretched, a later court may take the court at its word and
reach results that the drafters meant to avoid. These problems can be avoided
by simply acknowledging, as some courts have done, that consumer transac-
tions should not be treated the same as business transactions. 235
VI. NEW PAYMENTS CODE: SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE 3
Amendments to Articles 3 and 4 now are being considered for adoption in
the form of a New Payments Code. The primary impetus for the drafting of
the New Payments Code is the proliferation of new payment systems, such as
electronic fund transfer systems, which the Permanent Editorial Board of the
U.C.C. wants to bring within the coverage of Articles 3 and 4.
The drafters of the New Payments Code (the "revisers"), thus have an
opportunity to accomplish what the original drafters of Article 3 attempted but
failed to do. With the making of little substantive change in Article 3, these
revisers can create "a relatively compact, relatively accessible, relatively stable
body of law which will not cost a week's research for each ten-minute consul-
tation." 236 By making the following proposed revisions they also can make
the law more uniform and more certain.
The revisers should begin by attempting to remedy the previously dis-
cussed problems that have prevented Article 3 from being a code. First, the
revisers should go through Article 3 with the objective of ensuring that all
terminology, including, but not limited to, the terms "holder," "paid," and
"value," is used consistently. There is no reason to use terms that do not accu-
rately describe a desired concept. Nothing is gained and a great deal is lost
when one word is used that inaccurately describes a concept which could have
been described accurately with two words.
Second, since many sections of Article 3 merely supplement rather than
preempt the common law, a practitioner or judge is required to research the
common law. This research is, for the most part, unnecessary. With virtually
no revision of the substantive law, the revisers can eliminate the need for most
of this research. The revisers need only redraft Article 3 by incorporating into
its provisions the common-law rules that already supplement it. If the revisers
comprehensively state applicable rules and any exceptions thereto, a practi-
235. With the promulgation in 1975 by the Bureau of Consumer Protection of the Federal
Trade Commission of the Rule, Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433
(1983), reprinted in CONSUMER CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 11,380, and the state statutory enactments
preserving the right of consumers to raise their claims and defenses against holders or assignees of
notes given in payment for the purchase of goods or services, the need of courts to stretch or
misapply the requirements for holder in due course status in an effort to protect consumers is no
longer pressing. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-9 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-25 (Cum.
Supp. 1981); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1317.03.1 and 1317.03.2 (Page 1982); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 63.14.020 (1983).
236. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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tioner will be able to rely upon the answer dictated by the particular section.
In addition to the rules relating to conversion, defenses of accommodation
parties, and the finality of payment and acceptance, it would be helpful to also
incorporate the rules governing, among other things, damages for breach of
the transferor's warranties 237 and the introduction of parol evidence. 238 There
will be situations in which room must be made in a rule for judicial discretion
or for differences of state policy. When this is desired, the section should indi-
cate specifically which issues are of this nature.
Third, separate rules should be drafted specifically to provide for instru-
ments serving different purposes, i.e., traveller's, cashier's, certified, and teller's
checks. In addition, since the New Payments Code will be incorporating into
Article 3 new payment systems, it is essential that the differences in the opera-
tion and purposes of these payment systems be reflected in the specific provi-
sions governing each. Although the revisers will not be able to anticipate all
the potential new payment systems, foresight will prevent the rapid outdating
that has already afflicted Article 3.
There are two other types of amendments that would make Article 3 far
more accessible: (1) the elimination of the use of inaccessible terms and con-
cepts; and (2) the revising of some archaic rules that are contrary to common
sense. The terminology of Article 3 is needlessly inaccessible to anyone who is
not familiar with the N.I.L. Many terms used in Article 3 are terms of art that
may have been familiar to lawyers practicing law in 1950 but are certainly not
familiar to lawyers now. Many of these terms and concepts are not defined
anywhere in the U.C.C. A few examples of needlessly inaccessible terms or
concepts are the "finality" of payment or acceptance,239 "taking up" an instru-
ment,24° "lending one's name to another,"241 "after sight, '242 and "claim." 243
To take one example, what does it mean to say that payment or acceptance is
"final"? Presumably, to say that payment is "final" simply means that the
payment cannot be recovered. Would it not have been far clearer to express
the concept in these terms? Acceptance is "final" may mean that the acceptor
237. U.C.C. § 3-417(2) does not establish any measure of damages for breach of the trans-
feror's warranties. Comment I to § 3-417 indicates that all usual remedies for breach of warranty
are available. But difficult questions arise that are peculiar to negotiable instruments. See Com-
ment, Warranties on the Transfer of a Negotiable Instrument-U. C.C. 3-417(2), 17 STAN. L. REv.
77, 87-90 (1964); Note, Measure of Damages for Breach of Implied Warranty by Transferor of a
Negotiable Instrument, 25 ALB. L. Rav. 110 (1961). There is no reason why a decision about the
measure of damages should not be made by the revisers and incorporated into Article 3.
238. Since Article 3 contains no general parol evidence rule, in most situations reference must
be made to the state's general law of parol evidence. Brames v. Crates, 399 N.E.2d 437 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980); American Underwriting Corp. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., Ill R.I. 415, 303
A.2d 121 (1973). Courts have been anything but consistent in their admission of parol evidence,
See generally Jordan, "Just Sign Here-It's Only a Formality'" Farol Evidence in the Law of Com.
mercial Paper, 13 GA. L. REv. 53 (1978). There appears to be no reason to leave the law in this
state of confusion. Even if the revisers only provided rules for more common situations, a great
deal of confusion could be avoided.
239. U.C.C. § 3-418.
240. Id § 3-414(1); id § 3-413(2).
241. Id § 3-415(1).
242. Id § 3-503(l)(b).
243. Id § 3-306(d); id § 3-305(l); id § 3-603(1).
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has no right to refuse to pay upon presentment. If it does, does this mean that
a discharge in bankruptcy and other defenses under section 3-305(a)(a)-(e) can
not be asserted by the acceptor? If the revisers attempt to define these terms,
they will be forced to answer such questions.
Some important rules found in Article 3 may have made sense in a time
when negotiable instruments were used mainly by merchants familiar with the
rules of law governing negotiable instruments. But in a time when a vast ma-
jority of the population has checking accounts, and payment by check is the
rule rather than the exception, rules that may affect substantial rights of the
public must have some basis in common sense. If a person cannot know that
he may be jeopardizing valuable rights by his actions, it is unfair to penalize
him for these actions. There are two notable examples of this problem in Arti-
cle 3.
First, a holder of a check discharges all indorsers unless he makes timely
presentment and gives timely notice of dishonor.244 Presentment must be
made within a reasonable time.245 In the case of an uncertified check, this is
presumed to be seven days after the indorsement.246 Notice of dishonor must
be given before midnight of the third business day after dishonor or receipt of
notice of dishonor.247 An unexcused delay in either proceeding will com-
pletely discharge any indorser on the instrument248 and on the underlying ob-
ligation.249 Many people forget to deposit checks quickly and are often totally
ignorant that they must promptly give notice of dishonor. It is doubtful that
these delays are excused under section 3-511(1).250 If they are not, the in-
dorser is completely discharged. This result may make sense when the in-
dorser has been harmed by the delay. It may be unfair to require the indorser
to prove this loss. But there is no reason why the holder should not be permit-
ted to prove that the indorser in fact suffered no loss. When the drawer and all
prior indorsers were insolvent at a date within which notice of dishonor or
presentment would have been timely, it is reasonably certain that no loss has
been suffered. In this situation the indorser and not the holder should suffer
the loss.
Second, the formal requirements for negotiability make very little
sense. 251 The form required for negotiability gives an obligor no indication
244. Id § 3-502(l)(a).
245. Id §3-503(l)(e).
246. Id § 3-503(2)(b).
247. Id § 3-508(2).
248. Id § 3-502(l)(a).
249. Id § 3-802(1)(b).
250. Id § 3-511(1) provides that delay in presentment or notice of dishonor is excused when
the party is without notice that "it is due." Although this section can be read technically as excus-
ing the delay when a party does not know that presentment or notice of dishonor is required, the
section was not intended to be read in this manner. Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 3-511 clearly implies
that the party must be ignorant that the instrument is due. The two examples that are given are
when (1) an instrument has been accelerated without the knowledge of the holder and (2) a prior
holder has already demanded payment. Both of these examples involve ignorance about whether
the instrument itself is due.
251. U.C.C. §3-104 to 115.
1983]
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that by signing the instrument he is giving up his right to raise any defenses
against a holder in due course. No one except a student of Article 3 would
know that the difference between a non-negotiable and a negotiable instru-
ment is the use of a magical word like "bearer," 252 "order," 253 "cash" 254 or
"exchange. '255 Instead of these words of negotiability, it would make more
sense to require, at least where the transaction is not between two business-
men, a statement like "Signing of this instrument may deprive you of the right
to raise any defense you may have on the underlying transactions or other-
wise." At the other extreme, it is unclear why negotiability should be denied
to instruments that either are not payable on demand or at a definite time25 6
or for a sum certain257 or unconditional.258 A holder is not required to
purchase an instrument. Although an instrument may be unmarketable be-
cause it is conditional, in a sum uncertain or indefinite as to date of payment,
it may similarly be unmarketable because of the questionable financial condi-
tion of the obligor. If a holder wants to assume certain specified risks only,
there appears to be no reason to refuse negotiability to such instruments. A
holder in due course should be able to purchase such an instrument free of all
defenses except those expressly assumed. This also would enable all of the
other rules of Article 3 to be applied to such instruments as they already are
applied to section 3-805 instruments that fail to be negotiable because they are
not payable to order or to bearer.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since its enactment, Article 3 has confused and confounded lawyers and
judges. The reason for this confusion has been a misconception about the
methodology to be employed in applying its provisions. Most courts, com-
mentators, and lawyers have viewed Article 3 as a comprehensive code, when
actually it is a group of statutes addressed to specific problems that existed in
the judicial interpretation of the N.I.L. The proper methodology is to read the
sections of Article 3 against the background of the particular problems that the
sections were intended to remedy. Since most of the difficulty in understand-
ing Article 3 can be attributed to its drafting and not to the specific rules it has
adopted, the current drafters of the New Payments Code can remedy most of
these problems virtually without making any substantive changes in Article 3.
Simply because many current lawyers are familiar with the rules and terminol-
ogy of Article 3 is no reason to leave Article 3 in a condition bound to confuse
future generations of lawyers and judges.
252. Id § 3-111(a) and (b); id § 3-104(1)(d).
253. Id § 3-110(1); id § 3-104(I)(d).
254. Id § 3-111(c); id § 3-104(l)(d).
255. Id § 3-110(1); id § 3-104(1)(d).
256. Id § 3-104(1)(c); id § 3-108; id § 3-109.
257. Id § 3-104(1)(b); I d § 3-106.
258. Id § 3-104(1)(b); id § 3-105.
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